overriding goal of Chinese policy since 1978 and is a foundation stone for social
harmony and political stability. Central to economic development, of course, is
an available, secure, and affordable supply of resources and energy. Regarding
energy, China has been a net importer of oil since 1993, with near-double-digit
economic growth and nearly a quarter of the world’s population in a country
with about 2.3 percent of proven oil reserves. Oil consumption is expected to
reach 10.5 billion bbl/d by 2020. China will need to import up to 60 percent
of its total by 2020. Also, Chinese oil policy thus far conforms well to either a
mercantilist or a Maoist doctrine of self-reliance.Conclusions
Most likely China, like every country (and individual), is motivated by a
variety of causes, some of which may even be contradictory. What seems clear
is that the trend toward overwhelming power and presence to the nation’s south
will continue, as none of the defensive-minded motivations are sufficiently strong
to override trends in the growth of wealth and the natural expansion of military
power. Nor is there evidence of change regarding long-standing views about the
place of the southern waters in China’s territorial integrity.
On the Southeast Asian side, there areeconomic growth, minimal military
modernization, and laudable institutional activities that continue to tout the
possibility of moving toward a full-fledged security community. But there is little
recognition of the dangers of economic integration and concomitant ‘‘security
complacency,’’ the widespread belief that diplomatic interaction will settle what
have been in the past and could again become zero-sum territorial and resource
competitions. Southeast Asian states neither hedge fully nor balance effectively
against the rising influence of China. Nor has ASEAN or any other institution
stepped in to become an institutional midwife to the settlement of what are real,
if suppressed, disputes. ASEAN ‘‘has no power to deploy because it is neither a
defence community nor a party to a countervailing structure of alignments,’’^40
as Michael Leifer writes.
Such are some of the major trends and currents of thought. Practically speak-
ing, the next major watershed in China’s foreign policy is likely to follow some
kind of a settlement of the Taiwan issue. Once this issue, which has been at the
heart of great-power politics and to some extent regional politics for more than
half a century, is concluded, Beijing will either lose a major source of nationalism
and unity, or turn to other foreign policy concerns. If the 1992 Law of the
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone has meaning, it could become the basis
for a much more assertive policy, backed by the much greater military presence
afforded by what will be a military with serious power-projection capabilities.184 Asia Looks Seaward