- An attacker could theoretically try to close Indonesia’s Lombok and Sunda Straits as
well, but after a temporary disruption, energy shippers would likely bypass these chokepoints,
finding new routes to key East Asian markets. By interdicting critical chokepoints, moreover,
the attacking party might sacrifice its Asian allies’ well-being and strain global tanker capacity,
driving up tanker rates for oil consumers around the world. Japan and South Korea do have
strategic oil stockpiles which, depending on the blockade’s duration, could help them avoid
supply shocks. Japan, for instance, has ninety-two days’ worth of oil in its strategic petroleum
reserve. Even so, diplomatic, economic, and political fallout of closing Malacca would be
severe. - See High Seas Convention (1958), Article 8; United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (1982), Articles 32, 58(2), 95, and 236; A. Ralph Thomas and James C. Duncan,
‘‘Annotated Supplement to theCommander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations,’’
U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies73 (1999): 110, 221, 259, 390; Chairman
of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 3121.01B (January 2005); Joel Doolin, ‘‘The Prolifera-
tion Security Initiative: Cornerstone of a New International Norm,’’Naval War College Review
59, no. 2 (spring 2006). The author thanks Prof. Peter Dutton for his guidance in this area. - A bill of lading, often abbreviated BOL or B/L, is a document issued by a shipper
acknowledging that specific items have been received on board as cargo to be shipped to
a designated destination for delivery to a consignee who is usually stipulated. - Yue Laiqun, ‘‘Unavoided Malacca Strait’’ [Tupo Malike Kunju],China Petroleum
Enterprise,September 2005, 6. - For more information, consult William Murray and Gabriel Collins, ‘‘China’s
Counterblockade Options,’’ inMaritime Implications of China’s Energy Strategy(Annapolis,
MD: Naval Institute Press, forthcoming). - Gary Dirks, ‘‘Energy Security: China and the World,’’ speech at ‘‘International Sympo-
sium on Energy Security: China and the World,’’ Beijing, China, May 24, 2006.
Chapter 7
The views voiced here are those of the author alone.- Rahul Roy-Chaudhury,India’s Maritime Security(New Delhi: Knowledge World,
2000), xxii. - Arun Prakash, ‘‘Shaping India’s MaritimeStrategy—Opportunities and Challenges,’’
Speech at the National Defence College, November 5, 2005, http://indiannavy.nic.in/
cns_add2.htm (accessed February 21, 2007).
3.The Indian Navy’s Vision Document,AdmiralArunPrakash,DirectorateofStrategy,
Concepts, and Transformation, Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence (Navy),
New Delhi, May 25, 2006. - Indian Navy, Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence,Indian Maritime Doctrine,
INBR 8, April 25, 2004. - ‘‘CNO Calls for a New Maritime Strategy,’’Today in the Military,June 20, 2006, http://
http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,101925,00.html (accessed February 18, 2007). - U.S. Government Accountability Office, ‘‘Defense Management: Comprehensive
Strategy and Annual Reporting Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD’s Global
Posture Restructuring, Appendix I,’’ Report to the Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee
on Armed Services, House of Representatives, September 2006, GAO-06-852.
202 Notes