Peter Kien-Hong Yu, ‘‘Setting Up International (Adversary) Regimes in the South
China Sea: Analyzing the Obstacles from a Chinese Perspective,’’Ocean Development and
International Law38 (2007): 147–56.
Mark J. Valencia, Jon M. Van Dyke, and Noel A. Ludwig,Sharing the Resources of the
South China Sea(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997).
David C. Kang, ‘‘Hierarchy, Balancing and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International
Relations,’’International Security28, no. 3 (2003/04): 165–80; Yuen Foong Khong, ‘‘Coping
with Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Institutions and Soft Balancing in Southeast Asia’s
Post–Cold War Strategy,’’ inRethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency,
ed. J.J. Suh, Peter Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2004); Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan, ‘‘Betwixt Balance and Community: America,
ASEAN, and the Security of Southeast Asia,’’International Relations of the Asia Pacific6, no.
1 (2006): 37–59.
Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, ‘‘Hard Times for Soft Balancing,’’
International Security30, no. 1 (2005): 72–108.
Ian James Storey, ‘‘Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China
Sea Dispute,’’Contemporary Southeast Asia21, no. 1 (1999): 95–118.
Michael Doyle,Ways of War and Peace(New York: Norton, 1997).
Richard N. Rosecrance,The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming
Century(New York: Basic Books, 1999).
Thomas Friedman,The Lexus and the Olive Tree(New York: Anchor, 2000), 253.
David M. Rowe, ‘‘The Tragedy of Liberalism: How Globalization Caused the First
World War,’’Security Studies14, no. 3 (2005): 407–47.
Alex Liebman, ‘‘Trickle-down Hegemony? China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ and Dam-building
on the Mekong,’’Contemporary Southeast Asia27, no. 2 (2005): 281–305.
John Ravenhill, ‘‘Is China an Economic Threat to Southeast Asia?’’Asian Survey46,
no. 5 (September–October 2006): 653–74. Ravenhill finds the picture on FDI quite
mixed.
See Aaron Friedberg’s ‘‘The Future of U.S.–China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?’’
International Security30, no. 2 (2005): 7–45. See also U.S. Department of Defense,The Mili-
tary Power of the People’s Republic of China 2005(Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, 2005).
35.Jane’s Defence Weekly,April 25, 2007;Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—China and
Northeast Asia,March 22, 2007 (accessed April 25, 2007). PRC defense expenditures remain
at approximately 1.5 percent of GDP.
36.Jane’s Defence Weekly,April 25, 2007;Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment—China and
Northeast Asia,March 22, 2007 (accessed April 25, 2007); ‘‘PLA Navy Facilities,’’ Federation
of American Scientists Web site, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/row/plan/index.html
(accessed April 25, 2007).
David Shambaugh, ‘‘China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,’’
International Security29, no. 3 (2005): 64–99, 86.
Yu, ‘‘Chinese (Broken) U-Shaped Line,’’ 405–31.
Michael Leifer, ‘‘ASEAN as a Model of a Security Community?’’ inASEAN in a
Changed Regional and International Political Economy,ed. Hadi Soesastro (Jakarta: Centre for
Strategic and International Studies, 1995), 141, in Emmers, ‘‘Maritime Disputes in the South
China Sea,’’ 9.
