well find its way into Asian politics. It is equally plausible that Beijing and
New Delhi will temper their enthusiasm for Mahanian precepts, deploying mari-
time power as an instrument of regional cooperation. If so, Chinese and Indian
mariners could find themselves prosecuting humanitarian, counter-piracy, and
counterterrorist operations together. Either strategic pathway would give rise to
corresponding reactions from stakeholders such as the United States and Japan.
The result could be rivalry or a durable maritime order.
It is important, then, to note that neither Asia’s maritime rise nor rivalry on the
high seas is fated. The historical record suggests that the trajectory of sea power is
rarely linear. Few if any analysts of the mid-1800s would have predicted the rise
of American sea power, let alone decades of American dominion over the Asian
seas. British sea power was checked and challenged by Spain and France for over
a century, and was by no means assured until the downfall of Napoleonic France
in 1815. Similarly, externalities or unexpected developments could compel
great Asian land powers to modify their naval ambitions, or even frustrate these
ambitions altogether. For example, a resurgence of Russia, China’s historic rival
to the north, could very well force Beijing to divert resources from its navy—
slowing any Chinese efforts to assert controlovertheChinaseasorbuildup
forces in the Indian Ocean basin. Alternatively, an economic downturn compa-
rable to that of the 1990s would set back political and financial support for naval
power in all affected capitals.
Even if observers assume that Asian naval programswillexpand along a linear
path, the question of sustainability will remain. Numbers of ships and even
technological wizardry are by themselves insufficient measures of seagoing might.
As Mahan counseled, there is far more to sea power than warships and weaponry.
Certain coastal nations enjoy innate advantages deriving from geography,
natural resources, and territorial extent. Cultural traditions and maritime genius,
furthermore, constitute sinews of lasting sea power. To date, neither India nor
China has proved it possesses these Mahanian qualities in adequate supply to
make itself preeminent in Asian waters.
Critics, moreover, may protest that the economic interdependence resulting
from globalization will attenuate the competitive aspects of sea power in Asia.
By their logic, Asian governments will avoid destabilizing actions that give rise
to naval rivalry or conflict, holding at risk the seaborne commerce so crucial
to the region’s economic growth. From a rational-choice perspective, weaker
naval powers ought to maximize their ability to free ride on the efforts of the
U.S. Navy, the current guarantor of freedom of navigation. In other words,
the United States provides an international public good that should dissuade
other powers from upsetting the existing maritime order. Yet rationality as con-
strued by scholars and analysts is not the sole arbiter of international affairs.
National passions count as well. In a previous era of globalization, many pundits
proclaimed that war was at once inconceivable and irrational. By 1914, the major
Introduction 15