CHAPTER 3
THE LAST DAYS OF THE ROYAL NAVY:
LESSONS FROM BRITAIN’S STRATEGIC
RETREAT FROM THE PACIFIC
Nicholas Evan Sarantakes
The purposes of this chapter are to examine how the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland responded to the strategic rise of Imperial
Japan during the first half of the twentieth century, and to ask whether the United
States can learn lessons from the experience of its English-speaking cousin as it
deals with similar transitions in Asia in the twenty-first century. Although history
never repeats itself, it presents a database for scholars and practitioners seeking
instructive case studies. In this particular case, there are some parallels between
the British position in Asia and the Pacific then and the situation confronting
the United States in the early decades of this new century. These parallels warrant
a venture in applied history—which is what this chapter aspires to be.
What are the similarities between the Asia-Pacific then and now? First, Britain
in the 1910s and 1920s found itself embroiled in greater and greater disputes with
its ally, Imperial Japan. In a similar vein, the United States, though never formally
allied with the People’s Republic of China, did cooperate with the Asian nation
during the second half of the Cold War and now finds itself increasingly distant
from the Chinese. Second, the United Kingdom, like the United States now,
found itself dealing with this shift during a period when its navy was shrinking
in size. Finally, both nations had takenon security obligations they lacked the
resources to honor. The British were obliged to protect their colonies in Burma,
Hong Kong, Malaysia, and the dominions of Australia and New Zealand.
For its part, the United States has assumed responsibility for the defense of Taiwan
and, to a lesser degree, South Korea.
The central argument set forth in this chapter is that despite British leaders’
fairly reasoned and realistic assessment of international affairs in the Asia-Pacific