the greater task of preparing for a classic naval war against Japan, as that erstwhile
ally became the most challenging competitor to U.S. interests in China and
throughout East Asia.
Tokyo believed it should represent—that is, have the advantage of—Asian
economic interests. The United States not only disagreed, insisting on equal
access to those interests, but offered Japan a natural hostage in the Philippines.
From almost the beginning of the twentieth century, U.S. Navy planning was
focused on possible war with the IJN (Imperial Japanese Navy). Such a contest,
it was assumed, would be fought as described by Alfred Thayer Mahan, with a
climactic sea battle deciding the conflict.
Hence, the American maritime presence in Asia began in the early nineteenth
century with the mission of protecting commercial and other interests. By the
early years of the next century, that mission continued, but was secondary to pre-
paring for a great naval war against Japan. A century later, with the global war on
terror marking the onset of the twenty-first century, U.S. naval missions in Asian
waters seem no less important, but they seem somehow blurred by a lack of focus.
Throughout these many decades, however, U.S. sea power has been projected
into Asian waters as the primary vehicle of U.S. foreign policy. Economic, politi-
cal, and cultural American interests all rode on the back of its warships. The navy
in turn constantly strove to design and implement a maritime strategy appropri-
ate to ensure the completion of American policy objectives. This strategy–policy
process is always difficult to design and even more difficult to implement. This
chapter will explore how successful the United States has been in this endeavor.
Early Maritime Encounters in Asia
The United States established an Asian naval presence even before it had a
Pacific coast. In 1832, the 42-gun U.S. naval frigatePotomacwas dispatched by
President Andrew Jackson to Southeast Asia to avenge an act of piracy committed
against an American trader, theFriendship.As reprisal for the massacre of the
Friendship’s crew,Potomacdestroyed some (probably innocent) Sumatran villages
and killed over 150 Malays, establishing an American naval presence in Asia
that has continued to the present day.^1 A more regular U.S. naval presence was
established between 1838 and 1842, when the ‘‘Exploring Squadron’’ cruised
western Pacific waters.
Navalwarfare,includingamphibiousassaults,wastheprimarymeans
by which Great Britain conducted the First Opium War (1840–42) against
the corrupt and failing Chinese Qing Dynasty. Beijing had allowed China’s
once-formidable navy to deteriorate into impotence, and foreign warships faced
practically no opposition afloat. Furthermore, their decrepit defensive installa-
tions and obsolete equipment severely handicapped the ability of Chinese land
forces to resist.
Clipper Ships to Carriers 47