The islands also drove American diplomacy for much of the first half of the
twentieth century, which worked to the detriment of general U.S. national
security, since efforts to secure the Pacific possessions at once appeased Tokyo
and encouraged further Japanese expansion.
The United States emerged as an Asian maritime power following its emergence
as a formal colonial power. President Theodore Roosevelt signaled that develop-
ment dramatically in 1907, when he dispatched a naval task force to circumnavi-
gate the globe. This force of sixteen battleships was informally called the Great
White Fleet because of the ships’ hull color; it spent five months of its two-year
world cruise in Asian waters, including port calls in Japan, China, the Philippines,
Australia, and New Zealand. The fleet made a strong impact during this portion
of its cruise, particularly during its Tokyo visit. Although Roosevelt apparently
took a benign view of a rapidly modernizing Japan, he was worried about that
nation’s growing naval power, which had been amply demonstrated against China
in 1894 and against Russia in 1905. The Great White Fleet had a direct effect on
Japan. The fleet’s voyage was, quite simply, Washington’s announcement to the
world that the United States had achieved world power status.^8
The American naval presence in Asia went hand-in-hand with diplomacy,
as the United States signed a series of agreements with Japan, the core of which
agreed to that nation’s dominance over Korea in return for Tokyo’s nominal
acquiescence in American colonial holdings in East Asia. The first of these was
the Taft-Katsura Agreement of 1905, in which Japan’s Prime Minister Katsura
Taro stated that his government did not ‘‘harbor any aggressive designs on
the Philippines,’’ while Secretary ofWar William Howard Taft acknowledged
‘‘Japanese suzerainty over Korea.’’^9
This memorandum, approved by President Roosevelt, was followed in 1908
by the Root-Takahira Agreement, which acknowledged Japanese and American
spheres of influence in Asia. The agreement, signed in Washington by Ambassa-
dor Takahira Kogoro and Secretary of State Elihu Root, emphasized maintaining
the status quo in the Pacific and the independence of China. It also reaffirmed the
Open Door policy. Japan and the United States agreed to respect each other’s
territorial possessions in East Asia, which meant—as stated in the text of the
agreement—that America acknowledged Japan’s right ‘‘to annex Korea and its
special position in Manchuria.’’^10
These agreements formed part of Roosevelt’s attempt to effect Asian policy
basedbothondiplomacyandonnavalmight.Theyalsoreflectedabelief
that the United States lacked the naval force necessary to ensure the security
of American possessions and interests in the Far East in the face of any future
Japanese hostility. U.S. maritime strategy, which focused on the seemingly immi-
nent threat posed by European powers, further constrained U.S. naval capability
in the Pacific. Great Britain’s 1902 treaty with Japan no doubt helped delineate
the limits of the United States’ ability to leverage its still young if growing navy52 Asia Looks Seaward