U.S. Air Force trumpeting of nuclear-armed intercontinental bombers, the navy
remained a major participant in the national defense. Hence, a ‘‘transoceanic
strategy’’ emerged in the late 1940s.^22 This sought to make maximum use of fleet
resources that were very scarce following the massive post-1945 disarmament.
The transoceanic strategy postulated a navy based at U.S. home ports in the
continental United States and Hawaii. This force would be ready for rapid
deployment to the scene of overseas crises that threatened U.S. security interests.
The focus was not on fighting climactic battles at sea, but on using a strong navy
to project power onto foreign shores.
In the Pacific, this strategy led to the strengthening of the Seventh Fleet,
permanently stationed in Japan. This fleet was first formed in March 1943 as part
of General Douglas MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific forces, but had withered away
after August 1945. The reinvigorated fleet’s first major challenge was the Korean
conflict in 1950–53. The onset of what was perceived as the initial steps in a
Soviet global assault on the democracies enabled the navy to recommission
hundreds of warships laid up after 1945. It provided the navy with more definite
strategic direction: defeating Soviet-inspired aggression throughout Asia and the
Pacific. This mission—global nuclear war with the Soviet Union—would under-
lay the development of American maritime strategy in the Asia-Pacific until the
end of the Cold War in 1990.
The U.S. Navy’s Cold War strategy in Asia was based on two primary princi-
ples. The first was the overseas basing of naval forces; the second was naval partici-
pation in nuclear warfare. The latter first manifested itself in the development of
carrier-borne aircraft capable of conducting strategic nuclear strikes against
Soviet targets far inland. By 1959, however, nuclear-powered FBM (fleet ballistic
missile) submarines continually on patrol had largely superseded nuclear-capable
aircraft in this mission.
Although now focused on the Soviet threat, U.S. maritime strategy remained
constant in certain respects, including forward-deployed battle fleets; FBM
patrols, which constituted one leg of the nation’s nuclear triad; the power-
projection capability embodied in theMarine Corps and carrier aircraft;
and defense of the homeland through ASW (antisubmarine warfare), which
involved constructing extensive underwater listening arrays. These capabilities
were implemented effectively despite periodic fluctuations in domestic political
support.
As always, it was not enough for a maritime strategy to look effective on paper,
even if proven at sea. This was especially true for the Asia-Pacific theater,
which seemed remote from U.S. shores and interests. Political support had to
be maintained, both within the Department of Defense and within the larger
domestic political arena, if the navy was to receive the resources necessary to
execute its strategy. The Cold War was marked by efforts to justify the strategy
and elicit the wherewithal to carry it out.
Clipper Ships to Carriers 57