ships, units, and personnel would be reassigned to the Atlantic theater during war-
time, represented a significant constraint on the United States’ ability to achieve
its strategic objectives in Asia, an intensely maritime theater, and Pacific Fleet
commanders never ceased trying to reorder those maritime strategic priorities.^24
The disintegration of the Soviet empire and the laying up of the Russian
Pacific Fleet; the emergence of China as a major participant in Asian economic,
political, and maritime relations; and the emergence of smaller Asian economic
powers led by Japan and South Korea mark the transition from the twentieth
to the twenty-first centuries. U.S. naval dominance, however, remained constant
during this transition.
Post–Cold War: The 1990s
Since the Cold War ended in 1990, U.S. naval commanders have been
seeking—generally without success—a replacement for Lehman’s effective
maritime strategy of the 1980s. The situation in the early twenty-first century
is somewhat analogous to that faced by the navy following World War II, and
therefore it should not be surprising that the transoceanic strategy so ably
described by Samuel Huntington remains applicable and attractive.
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps soon realized that the dissolution of the
Soviet empire and the disappearance of its big-navy threat had eviscerated the
maritime strategy of the 1980s. The first fruit of this realization was a white
paper issued by the secretary of the navy in September 1992, titled...From the
Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the Twenty-first Century. From the Seasought
to reshape U.S. maritime strategy in acknowledgment of the nation’s new
National Security Strategy and the political changes accompanying the end of
the Cold War. It proffered an essential shift in focus from blue-water battles
between large fleets to littoral warfare,emphasizingtheroleofnavalforcesin
joint operations launched from the sea to affect events ashore.From the Seaestab-
lished a Naval Doctrine Command to formulate and formalize the concept of
‘‘operational maneuver from the sea.’’^25
From the Seawas followed in 1997 byForward...From the Sea.^26 This docu-
ment differed little from its immediate predecessor, simply reaffirming the ability
of forward-deployed naval forces to project maritime power, influencing events
ashore in littoral regions during times of peace and war. This echo of Hunting-
ton’s transoceanic strategy emphasized the ability of the navy and marines to oper-
ate independently of shore-based political constraints. That is, forward-deployed
naval forces could carry out the dictates of the U.S. National Military Strategy in
near real-time without infringing on another nation’s sovereignty.^27
Applying the concepts encapsulated inFrom the SeaandForward...From the
Seato Asian waters was a straightforwardproposition, given the continued
regional dominance of even the much-reduced American navy of the 1990s.
Clipper Ships to Carriers 59