Simply put, the U.S. Pacific Fleet decreased by one-half between 1985 and 2005,
largely as a result of the end of the Cold War and the effective disappearance of
the Soviet fleet, the only credible maritime threat of the time. To an extent,
From the Seaand its successors represented attempts not only to offer naval forces
strategic guidance but to justify generous naval funding within the U.S. govern-
ment.The Post–9/11 Period
Efforts to frame a vision for the naval services continued into the era following
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Issued in 2002, the document known as
Sea Power 21sought to incorporate new technologies and organizational reforms
as the tenets of a new maritime strategy. It offered three operational initiatives
intended to maximize the effectiveness of joint and integrated operations:- Sea Strike:offensive operations by manned aircraft, cruise missiles, marines, and special
forces. - Sea Shield:a layered homeland defense, to include sea-based ballistic missile defense, mine
countermeasures, and ASW, as well as improved littoral warfare capabilities. - Sea Basing:use of sea-based forces to project power ashore without foreign basing.^28
Although this strategy attempted to acknowledge the shattering events of
September 11, it was essentially dead on arrival. The global war on terror simply
does not offer viable targets for aircraft-carrier task groups. Hence, it offers little
or no justification for operating fleets at sea, other than in supporting roles.
Using nuclear-powered aircraft carriers as transports for army helicopters is
hardly how naval aviation aspires to operate, and does very little to justify the
existence of these very expensive assets. Indeed, the navy’s ship inventory contin-
ued to dwindle through the first half-decade of the twenty-first century, a trend
that will continue barring renewed—and improbable—determination on the
part of the administration and Congress to recapitalize a fleet that lacks a com-
pelling maritime strategy.
In 2005, even as the decline in ship numbers was threatening the navy’s ability
to dominate Asian waters, the U.S. government issued a comprehensive NSMS
(National Strategy for Maritime Security).^29 The NSMS and the putative
‘‘1,000-ship navy’’ are nowhere more applicable than in troubled Northeast and
Southeast Asian waters, where allies, friends, and not-so-friendly nations all face
common enemies in the form of piracy and terrorism.
This strategy document’s stated objective is both far-reaching and Mahanian.
It mandates ‘‘a comprehensive national effort to promote global economic stabil-
ity and protect legitimate activities while preventing hostile or illegal acts within
the maritime domain.’’ Its definition of the ‘‘maritime domain’’ is even more
ambitious than Mahan envisioned, namely:60 Asia Looks Seaward