Asia Looks Seaward

range of missions at sea and in coastal regions; and finally, the navy is readily able

to forge partnerships with foreign navies.^32 This last insight—which informs

Mullen’s innovative idea of a 1,000-ship navy, also known as a ‘‘Global Maritime

Network’’—forms the core of the proposed new U.S. maritime strategy.^33

This does not mean a drastic rise in the number of U.S. Navy ships. It relies

instead on the concept of augmenting the approximately 300 ships likely to make

up the navy force structure for the foreseeable future with 700 additional vessels

from allied and friendly navies around the world. The concept follows the NSMS

by charging U.S. maritime forces with ensuring freedom of navigation through-

out the Asian maritime domain. Most importantly, the 1,000-ship-navy concept

focuses on interactions with other navies. In Asia, resources would come from the

maritime forces of trusted allies such as Canada, Japan, South Korea, Australia,

the Philippines, and Thailand. Some participation by the navies of other

Southeast Asian states, New Zealand, India, and Pakistan might also be expected.

Chinese naval participation in the Global Maritime Network could be feasible

for specific missions, such as safeguarding the Strait of Malacca and other critical

waterways against pirates and terrorists.

A U.S. Navy intent on a 1,000-ship strategy must overcome at least three

major problems. First, notwithstanding the global war on terror, naval leaders

must describe the maritime strategic environment in terms compelling enough

to justify a large, aircraft-carrier-based navy. It may well be that the time of the

huge flattop that displaces nearly 100,000 tons is nearing its end, but the nation’s

already huge investment in ten or more of these $5 billion-plus behemoths will

dictate their continued role as the center of fleet strategic and doctrinal efforts.

Second, the navy must convince the other services it has a viable role in the

joint, integrated effort against U.S. enemies. This will pose an increasingly

difficult challenge as the Department ofDefense sets out to recapitalize the

U.S. Army and Marine Corps after the strategic misadventure in Iraq.

Third and most importantly, the new strategy must convince Congress to fund

continued naval modernization in both technological and quantitative terms.

And the latter is just as important as the former: no matter how revolutionary a

warship’s capabilities, one ship can only be in one place at one time. ‘‘Force

multiplication’’ is a valid concept, but remains subject to the laws of physics.

The Next U.S. Maritime Strategy in Asia

U.S. maritime strategy in the twenty-first century faces serious limits on budg-

etary resources, personnel availability, and national security objectives. The gen-

eral strategic paradigm is the global war on terror, which pays relatively little

attention to the maritime sphere. This in turn drives budgetary and personnel

priorities within the defense establishment. Maritime strategy in Asia, moreover,

must justify the required investments without an apparent opponent in the

62 Asia Looks Seaward