extensive legal rights—maritime law enforcement, the right to enforce sanitary
regulations—to the coastal nation. The third zone, the EEZ (exclusive economic
zone), varies in breadth. A nation may claim such a zone, within which it pos-
sesses almost complete economic rights, out to a range of 200 nautical miles from
its coastlines, or, underwater geography permitting, it may claim a continental
shelf zone out to a maximum range of 350 nautical miles. This zone is defined
not by mileage, but by the measured gradient of the ocean floor. The nation
claiming it reserves the rights to exploitundersea mineral deposits, fisheries,
and other oceanic resources.
The limits and privileges codified in UNCLOS are not absolute, however,
since many of the signatory nations expressed ‘‘reservations’’ about specific provi-
sions. China, for example, expressed six significant reservations. During several
maritime incidents involving the United States, moreover, Beijing has seemed
to claim sovereign rights even over the continental shelf.
The first of these incidents involved Chinese harassment of the hydrographic
survey ship USNSBowditch,which was conducting survey operations in the
sea area claimed by Beijing as its EEZ.^37 The second incident was more serious.
In May 2001 a Chinese naval F-8II fighter collided with an American EP-3
electronic surveillance aircraft. The EP-3 was seriously damaged and made a
forced landing on Hainan Island, while the Chinese fighter crashed into the sea
and its pilot was killed. Beijing’s actions following this incident conveyed an
interpretation of UNCLOS that strongly implied a Chinese claim to sovereign
rights over not just the EEZ but possibly over the continental shelf as well.^38
China has voiced its dubious attitude toward the UNCLOS in less formal venues
as well, and Beijing’s representatives have often repeated these inferences.
Finally, China’s apparent views toward island possessions in the East and South
China seas reflect claims that may be unusual. If Beijing were to declare clearly
that the waters of the SCS (South China Sea) were sovereign Chinese territory,
it would provoke immediate objections and almost certain naval intervention
from the United States and, conceivably, from at least some of its treaty allies.
Any such claim would directly challenge the U.S. principle of freedom of naviga-
tion, which is integral to American maritime strategy.
The Economic Dimension
U.S. economic growth is closely linked to the world economy as a whole, with
most of the nation’s trade carried on the world’s oceans. Free trade at sea, more-
over, underpinned the burst of Asian prosperity that marked the past half-
century. And SLOCs directly affect the ability of the United States to move forces,
equipment, and supplies to crisis areas overseas. The Department of Defense
has named eight international regions—five of them in Asian waters—as ‘‘U.S.
Lifelines and Transit Regions,’’ since they contain crucial chokepoints such as
Clipper Ships to Carriers 65