An associated legal question is Indonesia’s declaration of sovereignty over
thewatersandSLOCsenclosedwithinitsterritory,whichderivesfromthe
novel doctrine of ‘‘archipelagic sea lines.’’ Jakarta’s apparent attempt to gain
control over shipping among its islands poses a serious danger to freedom of
navigation, since the straits through the Indonesian archipelago are important
for direct, cost-effective maritime activity between the Pacific and the Indian
oceans.
Finally, because of oil spills associated with accidents in the Strait of Malacca,
the international community has considered regulating shipping to meet
environmental concerns and assure maritime safety. There is no way to separate
commerce from the defense of U.S. interests in the SCS and nearby waters, and
defending these waters requires an effective U.S. maritime strategy.
Conclusions
The three essential components of the U.S. National Security Strategy—
peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and
winning the nation’s wars—all assume deploying forces to any part of maritime
Asia in a timely and effective manner. Forward-deployed U.S. Navy, Marine
Corps, and Coast Guard forces ensure that SLOCs remain open so that forces
deploying to the region can fulfill their missions. Maritime forces possess an
inherent mobility that ensures the ability to deploy from forward locations to
potential crisis areas. But naval leaders must take several factors into account if
they are to implement U.S. maritime strategy in Asia effectively.
First, the United States has adjusted its military strategy to address the multi-
ple regional interests and challenges ofthe post–Cold War era. U.S. maritime
forces redefined their focus to emphasize power projection. This strategic
reorientation found expression in the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps white papers
From the SeaandForward...From the Sea.The new mode of strategic thought
ushered in by these documents forms the basis for the 1,000-ship navy, itself a
version of a transoceanic maritime strategy first proposed in the late 1940s.
The missions projected in these documents include traditional roles such as
presence, strategic deterrence, sea control (SLOC passage), crisis response, power
projection, and sealift.
Second, U.S. naval forces are adjusting to the realities of budget cuts and the
consequences of stringent fiscal times for naval operations. The navy is reducing
personnel and operating expenses by one-third from the ‘‘Base Force’’ established
in 1990, which already incorporated post–Cold War reductions. The drawdown
will leave a navy of fewer than 300 ships in the near term, less than half of John
Lehman’s planned 600-ship force. Joint operations with other services, interoper-
ability with allied forces, and a fundamental redesign of seagoing operations will
have to offset this decline.
Clipper Ships to Carriers 67