CHAPTER 5
CAN CHINA BECOME
A MARITIME POWER?
Andrew S. Erickson
Despite possessing a coastline some 7,830 nautical miles long and some 3,400
offshore islands, China has pursued maritime development in an atmosphere of
considerable uncertainty.^1 The nation has long been a continental power with a
feeble navy, but recent assessments suggest that this historic pattern is changing.
China appears increasingly determined to create a modern navy. But—while the
possibility cannot be excluded outright—it seems that China is not developing
long-range power-projection capabilities. Rather, Beijing seems to be construct-
ing a navy geared to achieving asymmetric sea-denial capabilities on its immediate
periphery in order to defend its growing maritime interests, and in particular to
resolve the volatile Taiwan issue. Nevertheless, its combat potential should not
be underestimated.
At least for now, Beijing does not seem intent on fielding carrier battle groups.
Therefore, the PLAN is developing very differently from most other large navies,
and from the U.S. Navy in particular. Chinese naval strategists seem to embrace
their own universal logic of sea power, with both Mahanian and Marxist under-
currents. Despite these foreign influences, however, they insist that China has
not, and will not, replicate the martial patterns of the West. Yet, exceptionalism
aside, Chinese naval development today seems to be constrained less by ideology
than by capabilities. A concerted effort toimprove these capabilities is clearly
underway and enjoys the sustained support of China’s leadership. More relevant
questions are, therefore: What kind of force structure will allow China to execute
its strategies effectively, thereby achieving its political objectives? How feasible are
China’s plans for force-structure development, and how long will it take to fulfill
such plans? A close examination of these and other developments will furnish
insights into how strategic thought influences Chinese maritime strategy.