Beijing previously sought substantial access to Europe’s nascent Galileo
system,^109 which Chinese analysts have scrutinized.^110 While Europe reportedly
never planned to give Beijing access to the military component of the system,
there was concern that China might be able to penetrate Galileo’s PRS (Public
Regulated Service) receivers.^111 Duebothtosuchsecurityconcernsandto
Galileo’s importance as a strategic pan-European asset, the Galileo Joint Under-
taking (in which China invested $6.5 million as a shareholder, and through
which China had agreed to invest an additional $260 million) will be replaced
in 2007 by the Galileo Supervisory Authority, in which ownership is solely
European. Sino-European disagreement concerning Beijing’s access to Galileo
has apparently intensified existing Chinese efforts to develop Beidou. Indeed,
there are reports that China seeks to purchase hydrogen master atomic clocks—
the keystone of an effective satellite navigation system—from Galileo’s supplier,
Switzerland’s Neuchatel Time.^112 While Beidou previously appeared to be rudi-
mentary and perhaps subordinate to Galileo, the launch of additional satellites
will increase the system’s military applications.^113
China’s official media reports that Beidou will be developed into a full, inde-
pendent navigation satellite constellation called Compass. Designed to cover
China and surrounding regions by 2008, Compass would ultimately use five
satellites in geostationary earth orbit and thirty in medium earth orbit to provide
global coverage.^114 Compass’s commercial Open Service would offer ‘‘position-
ing accuracy within 10 meters, velocity accuracy within 0.2 meter per second
and timing accuracy within 50 nanoseconds,’’^115 whileanevenmoreaccurate
signal, coupled with system status updates, would reportedly be available to the
PLA. There is concern that the radio frequencies used by Compass will overlay
both Galileo’s PRS and possibly GPS’s M-Code, thereby complicating adversary
attempts to jam Compass in times of conflict. Improvements in access to foreign
and domestic positioning systems increase the accuracy of Chinese missiles and
other position-dependent equipment. Development of Compass as a viable
independent system could improve Chinese access to reliable signals in conflict.
China’s aerospace development has profound implications for the U.S. mili-
tary. Chinese strategists envision aerospace assets playing a vital role in any future
Taiwan scenario. For instance, ballisticandcruisemissilesguidedbyBeidou
satellitesmightbeusedtotargetU.S.aircraftcarriers.Themostfundamental
question is whether the PLA will be able to master the developments in air-
and space-based platforms and C4ISR needed to support a PLA strategy beyond
the East Asian littoral. Such a strategic requirement would necessitate the contin-
ued transformation of the PLA, as at present China’s current submarine-focused
navy and its still-limited air force can only support the more modest strategy of
access denial. But just as China was not dissuaded from submarine development
in the recent past by American dominance in that area, Beijing also seems unwill-
ing to acquiesce in U.S. aerospace dominance. As China’s overall national power
Can China Become a Maritime Power? 89