The EconomistSeptember 28th 2019 Europe 492 evening at an Ibiza villa five months before
Mr Strache entered government, was dyna-
mite. A furious Mr Kurz ejected the fpö,
and soon afterwards became the first Aus-
trian chancellor to lose a confidence vote.
Yet he has shrugged it all off. True, the
culprits were not in his party. But it was Mr
Kurz who, to the consternation of Austria’s
European partners, invited the fpö, a party
with Nazi roots, to join him in government
in 2017. Even before Ibizagate the fpöhad
proved a troublesome partner. Herbert
Kickl, the interior minister and an fpö
ideologue, ordered a raid on a domestic in-
telligence agency. The government’s col-
lapse seemed to vindicate those who
warned about the dangers of embracing the
far right. Yet not only is Mr Kurz sure to be
reinstalled as chancellor, he may well pick
up where he left off with the fpö.
Understanding how that is possible re-
quires familiarity with the weariness that
had descended on Austrian politics before
Mr Kurz burst on to the scene. He built his
brand in two ways. First, by spotting the
gap in the centre-right market for a harder
line on refugees. Having previously pre-
sented a liberal face on migration, during
the 2015-16 crisis Mr Kurz, then foreign
minister, began to talk tough on borders
and asylum, and worked with Balkan gov-
ernments to close migrant routes. Many
voters lapped it up, though others feared
Mr Kurz was normalising the far right.
His second trick was to address Austri-
ans’ appetite for change. By 2017 endless
“grand coalitions” between the övpand the
Social Democrats (spö) had visibly run
their course; two-thirds of voters said the
country was on the wrong track. Mr Kurz
took over the leadership of his ailing party,
centralising control and instantly catapult-
ing it from third to first place in the polls.
Since then he has retained the aura of the
outsider. By convincing voters that only a
coalition with the fpö could unleash his re-
formist energy, he assembled his govern-
ment without much protest. “The work we
didasa coalitionwasverysuccessful,”he
tellsTheEconomistinBaden,offeringtax
cutsanddebtreductionasexamples.
MrKurzhasbrushedoffrecentmini-
scandalsoverelectionspendingand de-
stroyedharddrives.Forminga government
willbea biggertest.Therearethreemain
options:a grandcoalition;a re-runofthe
partnership with the fpö, which has
emergedmostlyunscathedfromIbizagate
(althoughMrKurzwillnotworkwithMr
Kickl);oradirndlgovernment(so-calledfor
thecoloursofa traditionaldress)withthe
GreensandtheliberalNeos,whomaybe-
tweenthemcommand20%ofthevote.
Eachconstellationpresentsproblems.
Revertingtoa grandcoalitionwouldtorpe-
doMrKurz’sreputationfordisruption.A
dirndl government would be tested by
strainsonmigrationandwelfare.Andto
teamupwiththefpöistobeexposedtoits
penchantfordramaandscandal;allfour
governments the partyhas belonged to
havecollapsedinignominy.ThomasHo-
fer,a politicalanalyst,comparesMrKurz’s
predicament to “a choice between the
plague,choleraandEbola”.Thecomeback
kid’sbiggestchallengemaylieahead. 7Rinse and repeatSource:Politico *RanasPILZin 2017 electionAustria,parliamentarypolling ,%0102030402017 18 19Kurz elected ÖVP chairman Election day
2017 election IbizagateÖVPSPÖ
FPÖGreens
NEOS
Jetzt*L
ike disorganisedstudents, Germany’s
ministers had to pull an all-nighter to
meet a deadline they had known about for
months. On September 20th, after the
members of the “climate cabinet” had
spent 19 hours negotiating in the office of
Angela Merkel, the chancellor, they un-
veiled a set of measures aimed at getting
their environmentally wayward country
back on track. It was a “Marshall Plan for
climate protection”, beamed Markus Söder,
leader of the conservative Christian Social
Union, Mrs Merkel’s electoral partner. But
it was instantly dismissed as inadequate.
Germany, the world’s sixth-biggest
emitter of carbon dioxide, will miss its
emissions goal next year. The target for
2030, by when emissions are supposed to
have fallen by 55% from 1990 levels, is also
looking difficult. Hitting it means cutting
annual emissions from 866m tonnes, last
year’s figure, to 563m in 12 years. The new
package aims to chart a path to that goal.
The paper is a potpourri of subsidies
and regulations, including investment in
electric-car infrastructure and rail, incen-
tives for cleaner heating systems, and ex-
pansion of wind power. At its heart is a car-bon price for sectors not included in the
eu’s existing emissions-trading scheme,
notably transport and buildings. The ulti-
mate goal is carbon neutrality by 2050.
The criticism has been withering. Some
experts had hoped for an initial carbon
price of at least €50 ($55) per tonne, eventu-
ally rising to over €100, to spur investment
in clean fuels and retrofitting buildings,
and to encourage a faster shift from the
coal plants that provide 29% of Germany’s
electricity. Instead, the opening price will
be just €10 per tonne in 2021, rising to €35 in
2025, and thereafter trading within a pre-
scribed price “corridor”. Critics also lament
the government’s unwillingness to touch
environmentally harmful subsidies, such
as tax relief for diesel. “The whole package
is just a big failure,” says Lisa Badum, the
Green Party’s climate spokeswoman.
Ambitions are limited on investment,
too. Olaf Scholz, the finance minister, said
spending would amount to €54bn in the
next four years, all of it financed from fresh
revenues. Yet although it can currently bor-
row at negative rates, the government re-
tains its commitment to the “black zero”
rule that requires it to balance the budget.
Claudia Kemfert at diw, a think-tank,
maintains it should be spending far more
on trains, insulating buildings and re-
search into cleaner fuel.
Defenders of the package point to an an-
nual review mechanism, monitored by ex-
perts, who can oblige the government to
adjust policy if sectors slip behind their
emission targets. And pressure from the
Greens during the package’s passage
through parliament into law may ensure a
higher initial carbon price.
Acknowledging the criticism, Mrs Mer-
kel says politicians have to ensure they
bring citizens along with them. The chan-
cellor knows that voters’ commitment to
climate protection fades when asked about
specific sacrifices they are prepared to
make. Better to leave hard decisions to the
next government. 7BERLIN
Germany’s new climate-change
package is widely pannedGermanyNot good enough