The Economist - USA (2019-09-28)

CHINA

Straitof

Malacca

SouthChinaSea

PACIFIC

OCEAN

ATLANTIC

OCEAN

Babal-Mandab

Strait

Suez

Haifa

25 areasmost

affectedbya

tradedisruption

Selectedland

connectionsto

maritime-roadports

Chinesetraderoutes

Bagamoyo

Djibouti

Zeebrugge

Tangier Cherchell

Piraeus Ambarli

Gwadar

Kyaukphyu

Laem

Chabang

Chongjin

Rason

Malé

Colombo

Aboadze Lagos

Walvis

Bay

Nouakchott

China’smaritime-roadprojectsclusterwheredisruptiontoitstradewouldbemostcostly

Sources:MercatorInstituteforChinaStudies;WorldBank;JournalofContemporaryChina;EuropeanSpaceAgency;

USNationalCentresforEnvironmentalInformation;NOAAGeosciencesLab/SOEST,UniversityofHawaii

*Whereworkis underwaywitha Chineseorganisationthathasa majoritystakeoris beingtaskedwithdevelopmentoroperation

0.010.1 0.5 5 101

Increaseinlengthoftraderoutesif closedto

Chinesetrade,weightedbycargovalue,%

Maritime-roadprojects*

Chinesemaritime

shippingroutes, 2018

TheEconomistSeptember 28th 2019 81

A

n old sayingwarns about Greeks bear-

ing gifts, but it might fit the Chinese

better. In the 1400s Zheng He, a Muslim

slave who became the Ming empire’s admi-

ral, led seven voyages south and west. He

offered treasure to every leader he met—

but only if they acknowledged the emper-

or, joining a world order centred on Beijing.

Chinese leaders today are following in

Zheng’s wake. The “road” half of its Belt and

Road Initiative (bri)—a global infrastruc-

ture-building scheme—is a maritime one

of seaports and shipping channels. Xi Jinp-

ing, China’s president, has said it will

create a new model of “win-win co-opera-

tion”. Some critics suspect nefarious mo-

tives, such as yoking poor countries to Chi-

na by giving them unrepayable loans.

The brihas evolved site by site and Chi-

nese officials have not made their inten-

tions clear. However, the locations of the 22

maritime-road projects that we have iden-

tified as under way show how it is most

likely to aid China. They suggest it will be

more useful for protecting existing trade

routes than expanding Chinese influence.

To measure the maritime road’s impact,

we tested three benefits it could offer Chi-

na. If the road were a resource grab, its pro-

jects should cluster in places that sell raw

materials that China imports. If its aim

were to boost trade, it should track the

busiest routes used by Chinese shipping

today, or where trade is likely to grow fast-

est. And if it were intended to secure cur-

rent trade routes, its ports should sit near

choke points—areas whose closure would

force goods to travel circuitously—or in

places that offer alternative routes.

We tested these explanations by using

them to predict if countries host a briport.

The results were conclusive. After holding

other factors constant, there was no statis-

tically significant link between having a

briport and exporting raw materials that

China wants, or having high current or pro-

jected trade with it. In contrast, the “trade-

protection benefit”—either the value of

Chinese trade in a country’s waters multi-

plied by the extra distance goods would

have to go if those routes were shut, or the

amount of trade that would be diverted to a

country if shipping were disrupted else-

where—was a good predictor. Given two

otherwise average countries, one with a

high trade-protection benefit (like Libya) is

2.7 times likelier to host a briport than an-

other with an average benefit (like Liberia).

Owning or running a port does not guar-

antee perpetual access, but it does give Chi-

na influence by enabling it to disrupt the

host’s own shipping if it chooses. Many

overland “belt” routes in the briwould also

make Chinese trade more resilient. For ex-

ample, if the Strait of Malacca were closed,

China could switch to briports it wants to

build in Myanmar, and finish the trip on

planned brirail lines.

China’s military footprint also shows a

focus on guarding trade routes. Its only

base abroad is at Djibouti’s Bab al-Mandab

Strait—the waterway whose closure would

hurt China more than anywhere else. 7

China’s foreign port-building helps to

protect existing trade routes

The best offence is

a good defence

Graphic detailChina’s “maritime road”

Change in probability that country has Chinese

maritime-roadproject,percentagepoints

-20 0 20 40 60

95%

confidence

interval Median

Trade-protection benefit

Based on:

Chinesetrade throughadjacent waters

Potential raw materialexportstoChina

Projectedtrade growthwithChina