Evil Empire 71military technology and personnel, with the democratic principle of a
necessary separation between military and civilian policing.
Indeed, the Clinton administration had already been actively
struggling with this question. In late 1993, a year before Rosselló’s
congressional testimony, Washington, D.C., had sought permission
to deploy the National Guard to combat drug-related violence. While
nearly fifty guardsmen were already on the streets of the District
helping police with drug interdiction efforts, Mayor Sharon Pratt
Kelly asked the Clinton administration to make thousands of troops
available for up to four months in order to provide tactical support
to police during drug enforcement efforts. In a press conference de-
tailing her request in late October 1993, Kelly justified the potential
sight of armed soldiers on D.C.’s streets by saying: “We need the
Guard’s help. We’ve got a problem that is really of extraordinary
proportions. We’ve got to get real and do whatever it takes to provide
safety.” Like Rosselló, Kelly appealed to a prevailing sense of panic
over “out-of-control” violence.
Four days after Kelly’s inquiry, Clinton denied her request. He
based his refusal on the fact that guardsmen are not full time and thus
an extended mobilization would disrupt their work and family lives.
He was also persuaded by a private memo from his counsel that urged
him to deny the request on the basis of more substantive concerns
about violations of the Posse Comitatus Act, not to mention horrible
optics: “Whatever the general authority, the symbolic significance of
the President calling out the military to patrol on a regular basis in
the shadow of the White House and the Capitol would be enormous.”
Harold Brazil, a member of the D.C. City Council, put it more bluntly
when he told reporters from Reuters that he opposed Kelly’s request on
the grounds that it “would show the world that America’s capital is no
better than the unstable capital of some anarchist, Third World nation.”