used. Oberstleutnant
Johann Koeck who
was a commanding
officer of the MiG-29s
in Luftwaffe service
said: “The MiG-29
is a superb ghter
for close-in combat,
even compared with
aircraft like the F-15,
F-16 and F/A-18. This
is due to the aircraft’s
superb aerodynamics
and helmet mounted
sight. Inside 10nm
I’m hard to defeat, and with the IRST, helmet
sight and Archer I can’t be beaten. Period.
Even against the latest Block 50 F-16s the
MiG-29 is virtually invulnerable in the close-in
scenario. They [the pilots of the adversary
aircraft] might not like it, but with a 28 ̊/sec
instantaneous turn rate (compared to the
Block 50 F-16’s 26 ̊) we can out-turn them.
Our stable, manually controlled airplane
can out-turn their FBW [Fly By Wire] aircraft.
But the real edge we have is the Archer
which can reliably lock on to targets 45 ̊ off-
boresight.”
The MiG-29 was an innovative aircraft,
but it did have a number of drawbacks, the
two most notable being its lack of range
and its limited BVR (Beyond Visual Range)
interception capabilities, due to the lack of an
active radar missile.JOINING THE LUFTWAFFE
On October 3, 1990 the Federal Republic
of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic became one nation. A day later,
JG-3 at Preschen and its MiG-29s came
under the control of the Bundeswehr,
the armed forces of the Federal German
Republic.
On October 19, 1990 the rst ight of
the MiG-29 under the Luftwaffe (German
Air Force) took place with aircraft 604 taking
off from Preschen, still wearing its NVA
camou age, but now carrying its new serial
29+01.
In January 1991, four MiG-29s were
dispatched to the Wehrtechnische
Dienststelle für Luftfahrzeuge und
Luftfahrtgerät der Bundeswehr (WTD 61
Test and Evaluation
Centre) at Manching
for evaluation. There
was a debate at this
time as to whether
or not to incorporate
the aircraft into the
Luftwaffe. At the
same time, four
experienced pilots
(weapons instructors/
test pilot school
graduates) were
sent to Preschen to
evaluate the aircraft from an operational
point of view.
As part of this exercise, four aircraft weresent to Wittmundhafen Air Base in March
1991 to y with the F-4Fs of JG 71. In
April, four of the Fulcrums were deployed
to Decimomannu in Sardinia. ‘Deci’ had an
air combat manoeuvring installation (ACMI)
off the western shore of the island in which
NATO aircraft could practise and re ne their
DACT (dissimilar air combat training).
Major Wolfgang Michalski was ordered
to Preschen in December 1990 from
Jagdbombergeschwader (Fighter Bomber
Wing/JaboG) 36, an operational F-4F Wing,
based at Rheine-Hopsten, Westphalia to
become the MiG-29 squadron commander.
He was also one of the four pilots heavily
involved in the evaluations and recalls:
“When I saw the Fulcrum for the rst time
in December 1990 I was stunned. Little
was known up to this time, except for some
intelligence reports, the rst appearance in
Finland 1986 and the air show crash in Paris
in 1989. It was ‘the opponent’, the ultimate
threat, we were trained to ght and all of a
sudden we were about to y it ourselves.
“During the evaluation programme we
ew numerous missions over the North Sea
against all types of NATO ghters and also
gured out ‘turn-back and escape’ parametersfor the AWACS in
Desert Storm. [This
exercise was called
Escape Party].”
Another task was
to nd out how the
Fulcrum worked
within the Warsaw
Pact air defence
system. “We saw
that the whole
system worked OK
in a GCI [ground
controlled intercept]
close control
scenario, even under ECM [electronic
countermeasures] conditions, due to data
link,” he said. “That corresponded with
the Russian philosophy, whereas we were
educated to decide and act on our own.
“During our rst deployment to ‘Deci’ in
March/April 1991, we ew against US F-16s,
F-15s, British [Tornado] F3s and others. It
was obvious that the Fulcrum could not
compete with a modern western ghter in a
BVR scenario due to de ciencies in avionics.
“The information you get from the radar is
very limited and works only with good GCI
support.
“Once you hit the visual arena or the
merge, it becomes a different story. The
manoeuvring capabilities and the Archer
missile, in combination with the helmet-
mounted sight, made it a more or less even
game, depending on the pilot’s skills. Of
course, the station time was always a limiting
factor in comparison to F-16, F-15 and F/A-18.
“Talking about maximum performance
and optimum manoeuvring you have to keep
in mind that all four of us had just around
50 hours on the jet and that it was still in the
original out t. That means: cockpit layout
and all writing in Cyrillic, ying parameters in
metric measurement.”
Wolfgang went on to command the
squadron until 1995.
Following the conclusion of these
evaluations, the decision was made to accept
the MiG-29 into the Luftwaffe and, in October
1991, the aircraft was integrated into NATO’s
Air Defence structure and designated MiG-
29G, the G being for German.
The MiGs remained for the time being
at Preschen, which
was one of very
few NVA air bases
that were retained.
The integration of
the Fulcrum into
NATO created some
problems – it required
many changes to
procedures and
was not without
controversy.
The language
issues outlined by
Michalski were very signi cant, but there
were other issues which taxed the pilots
and to which they had to adapt. ForPreparing for a sortie, Luftwaffe MiG-
29G 29+12 still retained its original NVA
camou age scheme in 1994 at Preschen.
While on the ground, the intakes of the
Fulcrum are covered by large doors to avoid
the engines ingesting objects that could
damage the powerplants. On start-up, the air
is drawn to the engines through slats on top
of the wing root. The doors retract only when
the aircraft lifts off and close again on touch-
down. Stefan PetersenMiG-29UB 179 is prepared for ight at
Preschen in 1990. The NVA received four
MiG-29UBs, in addition to 20 single-seat
MiG-29s. Stefan Petersenhttp://www.aviation-news.co.uk 2118-23_german_migsDCDC.mfDC.mf.indd 21 05/02/2018 14:02