combat aircraft

It was equipped with two internal 200-
watt jammers and could carry external
electronic countermeasures (ECM) pods
or cha dispensers. A pair of 300-gallon
drop tanks were usually  tted to give the
aircraft extra legs.
One of the leaders of the  rst strike ‘up
north’ was Capt Duke Steinken. ‘We had
been briefed to  y over the water to the
Haiphong area, then west to our IP [initial
point] near the SAM sites outside of Hanoi,
where we would set up a racetrack pattern
at 20,000ft. We were about 110 miles from
Da Nang over water, close to Vinh, when I
calculated we were not going to make our
IP on time on the briefed course. I plotted
a new direct course and we transitioned
overland towards Hanoi.
‘As we passed to the west of Thanh Hoa
I intercepted numerous ‘Fire Can’ control
radars and commenced jamming them
and breaking their radar lock. Maj Mitchell,
my pilot, said, ‘Duke, look out here’. I saw
the entire area was full of heavy AAA

[anti-aircraft artillery]. We got through that

and arrived at our IP right on time, as the

F-105s began to attack the SAM sites for

over 20 minutes.

‘Collectively, the six EF-10Bs intercepted

and jammed ground-controlled

interception radar,  re control and SA-2

‘Fan Song’ target tracking radar and we

also dispensed cha. The ‘Fan Songs’

indicated active SAM sites and threat

warnings were given to the strike force,

although no missiles were reported while

we were on station.

‘MiG formations were reported passing

through the area but there were no

engagements. After the attack we didn’t

attempt to join with the other EF-10Bs.

We departed alone and headed for the

coast and ‘feet wet’. About 33 miles north-

north-west of Vinh we received a MiG

alert at our six o’clock at 14 miles. We had

two 20mm cannon, but as we crossed

into North Vietnam we had test- red our

guns and both jammed — a common

occurrence. We descended rapidly to

low altitude over water and proceeded

to Da Nang, where we were the  rst

EF-10B to land.

‘We learned later the USAF lost several

aircraft but none to radar-controlled

AAA or SAMs. VMCJ-1 maintained an

ECMO [electronic countermeasures

o cer] full-time in Saigon to co-ordinate

electronic warfare missions for the air

force and navy. He asked the USAF

representative for some sort of unit

recognition for the squadron for its role

in the SAM strike operation. He replied

that they had already recommended the

VMCJ crews for the DFC for heroism and

extraordinary achievement.’

Night missions

The EF-10Bs continued to defend strike

crews all over North Vietnam. They  ew

nightly patrols along the demilitarized

zone (DMZ), providing real-time

warnings of any SAM or triple-A threats

IN THE DANGER ZONE

http://www.combataircraft.net // October 2018 63