HARRIER
‘PADDLES’
One of the biggest challenges in trying
to land the Harrier was that while
vertical landings required a descent,
the AV-8A aforded nothing in the way
of downward visibility. ‘In the AV-8A,
you couldn’t see down at all,’ Bill Spicer
recalls. ‘To your left and right you’re
looking into an intake. You couldn’t
see your wings.’ With this lack of visual
references, and no two-seaters for pilot
training until 1976, early AV-8A trainees
relied on instructors acting as landing
signal oicers (LSOs) to talk them in on
approaches to vertical landings.
LSOs were also critical for shipboard
operations, albeit in an unconventional
manner. As Spicer explains, ‘The LSO
didn’t have much work to do on
recovery. He’d compute the average
hover weight, but the pilots kept
pretty good track of their hover weight
coming back to the ship. Normally, we
were so low on fuel that hover weight
wasn’t a problem. The more important
mission of the LSO was the launch,
because he had to compute the wind
over the deck, and he would give you
the numbers for your short takeof and
the nozzle settings. Sometimes it’d
be 60°, sometimes it might be 65. His
numbers had better be right, because if
they weren’t, you’d end up in the drink.’
Ground-based talk-downs during
vertical landings were also common
during distributed operations where
engineers would bulldoze a clearing
in the woods and create a temporary
vertical landing zone with Marston
matting. During these operations,
a pilot would act as a landing site
supervisor. Outlining how these
operations worked, Spicer told Combat
Aircraft, ‘You’d ind the hole in the trees
they wanted you to land in and set up
your own deceleration, but we’d put
a guy down there on the ground, a
landing site supervisor, and he could
tell you ‘OK, you’re over the center of
the pad now. Stabilize your hover, hold
what you’ve got. You’re clear to land.’
They didn’t have to be an LSO, you
could just designate someone.’
The priority placed on maintaining a
ready deck, coupled with the Harrier’s
reduced dependence on wind direction,
meant the ‘Harrier carrier’ could reach
launch and recovery cycle rates a big-deck
conventional carrier would be hard-
pressed to match. Spicer told Combat
Aircraft, ‘Starting at the 300ft line, every
50ft we’d have a Harrier. So we could
launch eight airplanes in just about 100
seconds once we got it worked out. We
could recover those eight airplanes, from
the time the irst one hit the break until
the last one hit the deck, in somewhere
between two and four minutes. So we had
a rate of strike that a big-deck just couldn’t
have. I mean, there was no way.’
During the Nassau’s ‘Harrier carrier’ cruise
in the Mediterranean, VMA-231 and 542’s
AV-8As conducted surge operations to
prove the type’s maritime rate of strike.
‘There was a bombing range there [in
Tunisia] and we lew a ton of sorties out
there just to see how many we could
do over a three-day period,’ recalls Joe
Anderson. ‘It was just a phenomenal
amount of sorties. We kept it going;
everything was either in the air or being
refueled. It was really interesting.’ During
this period, Nassau’s Harriers proved
the type was capable of an average rate
of strike of 60 sorties within an eight-
hour period. While the AV-8A never saw
action, the marines took the lessons of
the deployment to war with the AV-8B,
employing LHAs as ‘Harrier carriers’ in the
Persian Gulf during Operations ‘Desert
Storm’ and ‘Iraqi Freedom’.
Perspectives from the
air and ground
Despite the hazards inherent in landing
the AV-8A, the type was highly regarded
by those who lew it. ‘It wasn’t like you
went out to the airplane to go ly it,’
recalled Spicer. ‘You went out and you put
it on. It became an extension of yourself.
When you cranked that beauty up, you
had an 11,000lb airplane with a 21,000lb-
thrust engine. The damned dashboard
would vibrate so much at idle that you’d
look at it and say, ‘Yeah, that looks like
it’s about 38 per cent’. With the smaller
gauges, it was shaking so much you really
couldn’t read them. It all smoothed out
once you got airborne, but on the ground
you knew there was a great big growly
thing right in the middle of your back.’
Spicer is still impressed with how
rugged the AV-8A was. ‘The AV-8A was
kind of like a bayonet. It might have had
moving parts, but not much went wrong
with it. It was really rugged. You could
beat it up, you could land it kind of hard,
and sometimes you did because we
were landing at weird places. It was just a
tough airplane.’
Col (ret’d) Russ Stromberg, who lew
the A-4 briely before converting to the
AV-8A compared the two types. ‘I would
argue that the AV-8A, above 200kt, was
more forgiving than an A-4. You can’t spin
a Harrier. You can lose an A-4 in a spin
— you can screw it in. The AV-8A is the
most honest airplane I’ve ever lown in
conventional light.’
For all the accolades heaped on the
AV-8A by those who lew it, the true
measure of any aircraft’s worth in the
Marine Corps comes not from aviators, but
Left top to bottom:
An AV-8A being
guided into
position on the
deck of the USS
Nassau.
A mix of VMA-231
and VMA-542
Harriers line
up at the stern
of the Nassau
during the 1982
‘Harrier carrier’
cruise in the
Mediterranean.
US Navy
An AV-8A of
VMA-231 aboard
the Nassau
during the
successful 1982
Mediterranean
cruise.
Below right:
A deck handler
holds up a board
showing the
aircraft’s weight,
its designated
position to begin
its take-off
roll, and the
recommended
nozzle position to
ensure a positive
rate of climb. LSOs
were critical in
calculating this
data for every
aircraft during at-
sea operations.
http://www.combataircraft.net // December 2018 73