1990 and remained so throughout the
unit’s combat deployment. Talking
about the early days of the build-up,
he said, ‘A month or so after the first 10
of our aircraft deployed, another four
arrived from Mountain Home along with
some extra aircrews. Mission planning
proceeded along two fronts. The first
was a basic plan to stop further Iraqi
aggression in case they decided to go
into Saudi Arabia. The second effort was
the plan that was to become ‘Desert
Storm’, which was briefed in Riyadh.
Representatives from all the deployed
units were in attendance, and after
the brief many of us returned to our
respective units and told in our wing
leadership of the plan. Each wing set
up a small, very restricted, planning cell
that involved only a few people. From
September until the end of December,
plans for the first three days of the
war were developed, refined and then
refined some more.’Mission planning was developed into
an exact science during ‘Desert Shield’
and on into the air war. Drummond
continues, ‘The EF crews used the final
weeks before the war to practise their
tactics in the local training area, including
an intensive effort in the low-level
environment using the Raven’s TFR.
‘Our primary concern didn’t come from
triple-A [anti-aircraft artillery] but from
Iraqi fighters. At first, CENTAF [US Central
Command Air Forces] didn’t consider
[the Iraqis] as being very proficient at
night flying, but around January 10, 1991,
there were accurate reports that they
were flying night missions in the vicinity
of Baghdad. More specifically, they were
flying exactly in the midst of where three
EF-111As would be lending jamming
support for F-117s. But by this time it was
too late to start altering the plan.’
It’s worth noting that a few of the F-117
pilots who were over Baghdad on the
first night stated that they almost flew information with patrolling MiGs, but the
enemy never knew they were there.
Squadron commander Hardziej relates,
‘About two days prior to the start of
the war, we were allowed to brief our
aircrews as to what they would be
doing on their first missions. After the
crews gathered and I briefed them on
the penetration escort tasking, you
could tell the tension was elevated
because no-one had expected to go so
deep into enemy territory with what
we thought was such a capable and
formidable enemy.
‘However, all of them accepted what
we had to do and immediately started
working on their own mission plans. I
also briefed our operations officer on his
duties and responsibilities should I not
return because I made the decision to fly
on the first mission.’
At 02.40hrs on January 17, 1991,
coalition air power unleashed an
unprecedented attack against a wide
variety of key targets in Iraq. The first to
cross the border were AH-64A Apache
attack helicopters that went after radar
sites close-in, including one that was
along the strike force’s flight path. At
the same time, the EF-111As that would
accompany the package were already
inbound and close to the Iraqi border.
They were able to see the explosions
from many miles away. The helicopters
timed their attack, with 27 laser-guided
Hellfire missiles, precisely at 02.38hrs.
At the same time, cruise missiles were
hitting Baghdad, with the F-117s right
behind them.Above: Lt Col
Dennis Hardziej,
the commanding
officer of the
390th ECS,
pauses for a
photo as he
mounts up for a
‘Desert Storm’
sortie.
Dennis Hardziej
Below: Crews
receiving mission
plans in the
EF-111 operations
room, located in a
hardened shelter
at Taif.
Dennis Hardziejhttp://www.combataircraft.net // July 2018 69
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