The Times - UK (2022-05-23)

the times | Monday May 23 2022 V2 49

Register

Windsor Castle
22nd May, 2022
The Lord Sharpe of Epsom
(Lord in Waiting) was present
at Heathrow Airport, London,
this morning upon the Arrival
of The President of the
Oriental Republic of Uruguay
and welcomed His Excellency
on behalf of The Queen.

Court Circular

The main housing duty on a
local authority to secure that
suitable accommodation was
available for occupation by ap-
plicants with priority need who
were accepted as homeless was
immediate, non-deferrable and
unqualified.
The Court of Appeal so stated
when:
(1) Dismissing the appeal of
Birmingham city council in the
case of four claimants, Abdel-
motalib Elkundi, Roberta Ross,
Cali Ahmed and Abdulwareth
Al-Shameri, housed in tempo-
rary accommodation, who
brought successful judicial re-
view claims, before Mrs Justice
Steyn sitting in the Administra-
tive Court of the Queen’s Bench
Division, for failure to discharge
the duty owed to them as home-
less applicants in priority need
under section 193(2) of Part VII
of the Housing Act 1996 to
secure that suitable accommo-
dation was available for occupa-
tion; and
(2) Allowing the appeal of
Ruba Imam against a refusal by
Matthew Gullick QC, sitting as
a deputy High Court judge, to
make a mandatory relief order
against Croydon London bor-
ough council, which had
breached its section 193(2) duty.
Timothy Straker QC, Jona-
than Manning, Annette Caf-
ferkey and Annabel Heath for
Birmingham; Zia Nabi and Jo-
seph Markus for the claimants
in the first appeal; Martin West-
gate QC and Sarah Steinhardt
for the claimant in the second
appeal; Kelvin Rutledge QC for
Croydon.
Lord Justice Lewis said that
Part VII of the Housing Act 1996
dealt with the imposition of
duties on local housing author-
ities to persons who were home-
less, that was persons who did

EVERY way of a man is right in his own

eyes: but the LORD pondereth the hearts.

Proverbs 21.2 (AV)

Bible verses are provided by the

Bible Society

Births

HASTINGS on 16th May 2022 to Jenny

Coad and Robert Hastings, a daughter,

Lyra Grace.

PERERA on 4th May 2022 to Frances

(née Trivett) and Robert, a son, Willoughby

John Giddy.

Forthcoming Marriages

MR I. PROCTOR

AND MR D. MCLAGGAN

The engagement is announced between

Ian, son of Douglas and Pauline Proctor of

Hampshire, and Duncan, son of Wendy

Franks and Gavin McLaggan of Taranaki,

New Zealand.

Births, Marriages

and Deaths

newsukadvertising.co.uk

020 7782 7553

LEGAL, PUBLIC, COMPANY &

PARLIAMENTARY NOTICES

To place notices for these

sections please call

020 7481 4000

Notices are subject to

confirmation and should be

received by 11.30am three

days prior to insertion

Law Report

Duty that housing authority owes to homeless people

in priority need and living in unsuitable accommodation

not have accommodation

which it was reasonable for

them, and members of their

family or household, to con-

tinue to occupy.

The natural reading of the

words in section 193(2), read in

context, was that, once the duty

was owed, the obligation on the

housing authority was to ensure

that accommodation was avail-

able for that person. In that

sense, the duty was immediate,

arising when the duty was owed.

It was non-deferrable and

unqualified, in that the duty was

to secure that accommodation

“is available for occupation”, not

that accommodation would

become available within a

reasonable period of time.

Section 206(1)(c) did not indi-

cate a different conclusion. That

section was concerned with the

discharge of all of the local

authority’s functions under Part

VII, not merely the duty under

section 193(2). The general, per-

missive words used in section

206(1)(c) were not intended to

indicate that the duty under

section 193(2) was qualified in

some way.

That conclusion dealt with

the time when the duty arose

and its nature. The duty would

continue until it came to an end

in the circumstances prescribed

by section 193. While the duty

was owed, it was to be per-

formed by securing that suita-

ble accommodation was avail-

able. Suitability was a flexible

concept. It would include fac-

tors such as the nature of the

accommodation, the length of

time that the homeless person

had been in the accommoda-

tion and his and his family’s

needs.

The lack of alternative ac-

commodation might also be a

factor affecting what was suita-

ble in the short or medium term,

as might the fact that the hous-

ing authority had limited re-

sources available to secure ac-

commodation. There might be

other factors that were relevant

either generally or in a parti-

cular case.

In other words, the duty to

secure that suitable accommo-

dation was available did not

mean that permanent accom-

modation suitable for long-term

occupation had to be provided

immediately once the duty was

owed. Different accommoda-

tion might be provided at differ-

ent times to ensure that the duty

was being performed.

There might be stages on the

way to the offer of secure

accommodation under Part VI

of the Act, which dealt with the

allocation of housing, or an

assured tenancy in the private

sector. What was suitable might,

therefore, evolve or change over

time depending on all the cir-

cumstances.

If, however, a local authority

decided that the accommoda-

tion that was currently being

occupied was unsuitable, then it

followed that it had to provide

other accommodation which

was suitable.

In the first appeal, the local

authority had decided that the

current accommodation was

unsuitable — not that it was

suitable in the short term but

would become unsuitable in the

long term. Once that position

had been reached, then, so long

as the applicant remained in

that unsuitable accommoda-

tion, the local authority would

be in breach of its duty under

section 193(2).

The corollary was that local

authorities would need to con-

sider with care the question that

they were addressing. They

would need to consider whether

the accommodation currently

being occupied was suitable in

the short or medium term but

unsuitable in the longer term, or

whether the accommodation

was currently unsuitable. They

would need to ensure that their

decision letters clearly reflected

the conclusion that they had

reached on that issue.

As to the issue in the second

appeal, in general terms, a range

of factors might be relevant to

whether it was appropriate for a

court to grant a mandatory

order to compel compliance

with the section 193(2) duty.

They included the nature of the

accommodation and the extent

to which it was unsuitable, and

the impact on the living condi-

tions of the homeless person

and his family.

They also included the length

of time that the homeless per-

son had been left in unsuitable

accommodation and the like-

lihood of suitable accommoda-

tion being secured in the rela-

tively near future as that might

mean that no mandatory order

was required. Resources and

financial constraints on the

housing authority were relevant

to whether it was reasonable for

a person to continue to occupy

accommodation or in assessing

whether the current accommo-

dation was suitable.

Once a duty was owed, how-

ever, and once the current ac-

commodation was found to be

unsuitable, financial constraints

could not justify non-compli-

ance with the duty imposed by

parliament and would not of

itself justify refusing to grant an

appropriate order intended to

bring about compliance with the

duty.

A court would expect a local

authority to address with suffi-

ciently detailed evidence the

steps it had taken, and the rea-

sons why suitable accommoda-

tion had not been forthcoming.

References to the general dif-

ficulties facing housing author-

ities, or the lack of availability of

suitable properties, might not

persuade a court particularly,

when there had, for example,

been a lengthy period of non-

compliance with the duty, or

where the accommodation fell

so far below any level of suitabil-

ity that more immediate action

might be expected.

The correct approach to man-

datory orders was to consider

whether the local authority had

taken all reasonable steps to per-

form the duty.

If it had done so, and had not

been able to secure suitable ac-

commodation, that might be a

good indication that it might not

be appropriate to grant a man-

datory order as it might not be

possible to secure suitable ac-

commodation within a specified

time.

A local authority could, how-

ever, be expected to demon-

strate what steps it had taken

and what the difficulties were. It

was unlikely to be sufficient to

refer generally to the demand

for housing or the shortage of

accommodation.

The authority might need to

explain, for example, the num-

ber of properties it had available

of the particular type in ques-

tion, such as houses with parti-

cular adaptations or with a

particular number of bedrooms,

and why it was not possible or

appropriate to use those for the

grant of (unsecured and there-

fore non-permanent) accom-

modation under its Part VII

homelessness duties.

It might, for example, have a

number of properties that it

would like to use for allocating

to applicants on its waiting list

for Part VI accommodation. It

could be expected to explain

why it was not using those prop-

erties to ensure that its Part VII

duties were met.

That was not to say that the

local authority had to make a

final offer of a secure tenancy of

accommodation to a homeless

person.

Rather, given that the duty

under section 193(2) would con-

tinue and might be met by the

provision of accommodation on

a short or long-term basis (until

it came to an end, for example,

by the making of a final offer of

Part VI accommodation), an

authority might need to explain

why it was not using its housing

stock to secure accommodation

that was suitable on a non-per-

manent basis to meet its Part VII

duties.

Lord Justice Underhill deliv-

ered a concurring judgment.

Lord Justice Peter Jackson

agreed.

Solicitors: Director of Legal

Services, Birmingham City

Council; The Community Law

Partnership, Birmingham;

Deighton Pierce Glynn;

Browne Jacobson LLP.

Court of Appeal
Published May 23, 2022
Regina (Elkundi and others) v
Birmingham city council
Regina (Imam) v Croydon London
borough council
Before Lord Justice Underhill, Lord Justice
Peter Jackson and Lord Justice Lewis
[2022] EWCA Civ 601
Judgment May 4, 2022

The simple way to place your

announcement in The Times.

Available 24 hours a day,

seven days a week.

newsukadvertising.co.uk

Call 020 7782 5583 or email

[email protected]

PIPPA SUZANNE DRACOTT WAS BORN ON MAY 28, 2020, AT

BROOMFIELD HOSPITAL IN CHELMSFORD, ESSEX, TO CLAIRE,

30, AND GARY DRACOTT, 30

50%

discount for

subscribers

The perfect gift

for new parents

‘She has her father’s eyes and

face shape but her mother’s

lips and nose’

Celebrate the arrival of a newborn in

Readers’ Lives, a service in contracted tributes

Join us for breakfast

Listen to Aasmah Mir and

Stig Abell on Times Radio,

Monday to Thursday at 6am

Legal Notices

CR-2022-000888

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY

COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES

COMPANIES COURT (ChD)

IN THE MATTER OF T.S.G.

BUILDING SERVICES PLC

(COMPANY NUMBER 03908728)

AND IN THE MATTER OF THE

COMPANIES ACT 2006

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that an

Order of the Insolvency and Companies

Court Judge Burton at the Royal Courts

of Justice relating to the above-named

Company was made on 10 May 2022,

confirming a reduction of capital of the

Company and the Statement of Capital

approved by the Court showing, with

respect to the share capital of the

Company as altered, and the several

particulars required by the above-

mentioned Act were registered by the

Registrar of Companies on 12 May

2022.

Dated 23 May 2022

Kingsley Napley LLP

20 Bonhill Street

London

EC2A 4DN

Solicitors for the above-named

Company