COMMENTARYBy Bill SweetmanRead Sweetman’s posts on
our blog Ares, updated daily:
AviationWeek.com/ares
[email protected]Today, you could be excused for
thinking that most of the F-35’s
troubles are behind it. The schedule
set at the end of May 2013 may survive
its second anniversary, a first for
the program. The Marines will likely
declare initial operational capability
this year, come hell or high water, and
the latter is unlikely to be an issue
at Arizona’s MCAS Yuma. Progress
reportedly is being made on sorting
out the engine problem that caused
last June’s runway fire.
It looks as if the F-35 could meet its
key performance parameter (KPP)
requirements, but that is a narrow
definition of success. Development
cost and schedule, and acquisition and
operational expenses, were not KPPs.
Those numbers are stabilizing (it
would be a disaster were they not) but
are not what the program aimed for.
Programmatic risk has become a
reality that users must accept. The
Netherlands is buying 37 aircraft
rather than the planned 85; the money
that would have acquired 60 F-15s
for South Korea pays for 40 F-35As.
The U.S. Air Force has put its badly
needed F-16 upgrades on ice and is
suffering readiness issues: The F-“I
f you don’t follow the defense business closely, then you can
be excused for believing that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
(JSF) is in trouble,” a Lockheed Martin consultant wrote five
years ago, a few weeks before the program ofce director was
fired in disgrace. His replacement found that the published
schedule was 3-4 years adrift from reality.JSF’s Year Ahead
Cost and counter-stealth will be key issues
fleet, with a deficient diagnostic and
logistics system, has a big appetite for
experienced support people.
Cost will drive more JSF stories
this year. The program has 700-plus
international sales on its books, and
relies on them to achieve planned
production rates before 2020, but fewer
than 5% are covered by signed contracts.
Getting firm orders is an increasingly
urgent matter. Denmark’s decision is due
this year, as is a U.K. defense review that
may indicate whether and when Britain
plans to acquire most of its on-paper
138-aircraft fleet.
F-35 customers looking at budgets
and schedules will want to know what
the Block 4A/4B upgrade package will
contain. Block 4A development starts
next year and 4B becomes operational
in 2024, making it the best capability
before 2026. The wish list includes
nuclear capability, Norwegian and
Turkish cruise missiles, Brimstone
and Meteor for the U.K., AIM-9X
Block 3 for the U.S. Navy, “5th to 4th”
communications and close-air-support
systems for the Marines. Nobody is
perfect, so 4A/4B will also fix discoveries
from operational testing. Customers had
better be ready to compromise.The second class of risk, as
the programmatic issue closes, is
operational. Counter-stealth technology
went from theory to big green pieces of
hardware in 2013 with the appearance
of Russia’s 55Zh6ME radar complex,
comprising a VHF active, electronically
scanned array (AESA) networked
with higher-frequency radars. Last
year saw claims of stealth detection
by the infrared-search-and-track
community and radar developers, and
the appearance of China’s analog to
the 55Zh6ME. Nobody argues that
stealth is dead, but has the operational
advantage of the F-35 been eroded?
Expect more of the same in 2015:
China is building its new, bigger Type
055 destroyer—it will not be surprising
to see a low-band AESA on its aft
deckhouse. Everyone and his aunt is
selling digitized versions of the veteran
Russian P-18 radar—counter-stealth
on the cheap. In response to concern
over low-band threats, Congress has
extended the F/A-18/EA-18G production
line and, with it, the debate over the
future makeup of the carrier air wing.
The Marines will continue to mitigate
operational risk by developing ways to
use the short-takeoff, vertical-landing
F-35B. The latest concept of operations
seeks to place ships and main bases
outside the range of mobile missiles while
keeping refueling and rearming points
close to the targets. Survival depends on
moving those forward strips faster than
the adversary can target them.
The Marines’ plan highlights that
the F-35 represents the continued
preeminence of tactical fighters in the
budgets of the Pentagon and other
customers. That is not a program or
operational issue but a strategic risk.
The Third Offset strategy has already
generated one paper that calls for
reduced emphasis on 600-mi.-range
fighters and more investment in bombers
and UAVs. The Navy’s debate over its air
wing, and the possible role of extreme-
low-observables and long-range UAVs is
part of that discussion, but will become
more important as the Long-Range
Strike Bomber program gathers speed.
We have passed at great cost through
much of the era of programmatic risk
with the F-35. Now, we are looking more
at operational risk, with strategic risk
on the horizon. c20 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY/JANUARY 15-FEBRUARY 1, 2015 AviationWeek.com/awstJSF PROGRAM OFFICE