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were strengthened both in numbers
and with new equipment. They were
complemented by a special operation
forces command founded in 2012.
The new look of Russia’s military
might became visible in spring 2014
when the armed forces managed to
very quickly and secretly move troops
to Crimea; later they would concen-
trate about 80,000 troops on the bor-
der with Ukraine. Another example
of quick operational deployment is in
the Arctic, where Russia has restored
a military base. Its air force has also
undertaken worldwide strategic deter-
rence missions, fl ying over the North,
Norwegian, Mediterranean, Baltic and
Black seas as well as over the Atlantic,
Pacifi c and Arctic oceans.
Increased military spending accom-
panied the organizational transforma-
tion. Profi ts from oil prices enabled the
Russian government to quickly increase
the military budget in the second half of
the 2000s. The defense ministry budget
increased nearly four-fold —from 574
billion rubles ($9.1 billion) in 2007 to 2.1
trillion rubles in 2013.
Russia’s 10-year rearmament pro-
gram through 2010 was estimated at
2.4 trillion rubles; the current procure-
ment plan for 2011-20 has a budget of
19 trillion rubles. The defense ministry
is asking for 30 billion rubles for rear-
mament through 2025, a plan expected
to be approved this year.
Along with improved training and
remuneration, the expanded budgets
allowed the military to replenish their
arsenals. As a result, the Russian de-
fense industry began to concentrate
on deliveries for the national armed
forces, in contrast with the 1990s and
early 2000s, when export contracts
provided the major source of income
for the defense manufacturers here.
Strategic forces are a major focus
area. In 2014, they received 38 inter-
continental ballistic missiles, includ-
ing 22 submarine-launched types.
The defense ministry deployed three
new regiments armed with Yars mo-
bile ICBMs , one Borei-class nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarine
and seven modernized Tupolev Tu-160
and Tu-95MS strategic bombers.
The air force received 142 new
fixed-wing aircraft in 2014, reportsthe defense ministry. This figure in-
cludes 53 Sukhoi Su-30 and Su-35
multirole fi ghters, 16 Su-34 bombers,
28 transport and training aircraft and
18 upgraded MiG-31BM interceptors.
The force also received 135 rotorcraft
including 46 attack helicopters and
72 transports as well as seven S-400
long-range air defense systems. The
ministry also reported deliveries of
179 unmanned aircraft.
D evelopment of future weapons that
can bring the armed forces to a new
level of quality is being fi nanced. This
includes the new Sarmat heavy ballis-
tic missile, a future strategic bomber
designed under the PAK DA program,
new transport aircraft and airborne
weapons. This year the air force has
started evaluation tests of the fifth-
generation Sukhoi T-50 fi ghter devel-
oped under the PAK FA program. The
fi rst order for this type is expected to
be placed this year after procurement
plans through 2025 are approved. By
2020, air defense is expected to incor-
porate an S-500 surface-to-air missile
system that will have anti-ballistic de-
fense capabilities. cof heavy weaponry necessary to reach
a target that high would typically be
controlled by military forces that aim
at military targets fl ying much lower.
What the case did highlight is that
the current reporting system is imper-
fect. As Malaysia Airlines itself criti-
cized, some airlines, but not all, were
warned of security risks in overfl ying
Eastern Ukraine and thus avoided do-
ing so. This fact alone is cause for an
investigation.
Ever since MH17, airlines are strug-
gling with how to deal with the new
world of aviation security. Problems
have escalated beyond security lines
and passenger ire over screening pro-
cedures. Cognizance of confl ict zones
was always in play, but airlines must be
even more vigilant now. For example,
after Hamas attacks on Ben Gurion
Airport, many international carriers
temporarily suspended service to Tel
Aviv. Several international airlines are
pondering requesting an integrated in-
ternational pre-warning system. Most
experts are skeptical because a lot of
the intelligence comes through infor-
mal channels that cannot easily be
opened to other recipients.
The International Air Transport As-
sociation has been active in the back-
ground, organizing working groups
and debates among airlines. But will
an integrated, harmonized, coordi-
nated approach really help? Those
questions have taken on new urgency
post-Ukraine incursion.
The damage to commercial aviation
extends far beyond the MH17 tragedy.
The devastating state of Russia’s econ-
omy and the fall of the ruble, caused by
cheap oil and international sanctions,
have forced its airlines into survival
mode. Transaero, one of the country’s
largest carriers, received a state-spon-
sored bail-out tied to conditions that
force the airline to fl y more to southern
resorts, in other words Crimea.
And of course cooperative projects
between Western aircraft manufactur-
ers and Russia’s aerospace sector are
on shaky ground. Airbus and Boeing
have engineering centers in Russia,
but Bombardier has shelved its plan
to establish a fi nal assembly line for its
Q400 turboprop there. And although
Ukraine’s Antonov aircraft continue to
be assembled in Russia, this relation-
ship is understandably fraught.
Russia holds a trump card as a
source of metals vitally important toaerospace. Companies in the West have
been stockpiling titanium and other
rare materials, to the benefit of RTI
International, a U.S.-based rare metals
company.
Whether Russia will continue on
the antagonistic course Putin has set
depends not just on reaction from the
world community but perhaps from dis-
sension within. Already protests have
been staged, prompted by the deterio-
rating national economy. Whether the
average Russian connects this to West-
ern sanctions or just chalks it up to bad
luck with plunging oil prices could be
key to Putin’s next move.
Despite the cease-fire in Ukraine,
skirmishes remain frequent. But even
with new domestic challenges, Putin’s
rhetoric indicates he regrets nothing.
Asked at his Dec. 18 press conference
whether the current economic prob-
lems were the price the country had
to pay for Crimea, Russia’s three-term
president took a more expansive view.
“This is actually the price we have
to pay for our natural aspiration to
preserve ourselves as a nation,” Putin
said. “It is not about Crimea but about
us protecting our independence, our(^) sovereignty and our right to exist.” c