“The most dangerous cost-imposing strategy is the one we
impose on ourselves,” says Center for a New American Se-
curity analyst Ben FitzGerald. “It’s taking out a HiLux truck
with a $500,000 weapon.” But a near-peer threat will be the
driving factor. “You can’t lose an advantage versus a near-peer,”
FitzGerald adds. “You don’t come back from that position.”
Martinage says that the CSBA report does not recommend
specifi c numbers for new systems “because we did not in-
tend this to be a budget drill.” But as one example,
the Northrop Grumman study cited in the report
suggests that a Navy UCAS force could replace a
two-times-larger force of manned aircraft.
Submarine warfare is seen as another area where
the U.S. has a substantial and enduring lead. The
Third Of set report advocates improving the fi re-
power and fl exibility of submarine forces by accel-
erating the development of unmanned underwater
vehicles, developing a long-range boost-glide weapon
for submarine launch, and developing towed payload
modules. The latter could be 3,000-4,000-ton un-
manned systems with up to 12 large-diameter launch
tubes, which could be towed into position and remain
on station for months. Again, there is a price to be
paid: the scaled-back procurement of large surface
combatants of the DDG-51 class.
In the Third Of set strategy, the use of special operations
and counterterrorism land forces is favored over large mili-
tary formations. Ground forces, however, would play a strong
role in establishing “local area A2AD networks,” particularly
on the territory of threatened allies. Systems such as land-
based anti-ship cruise missiles linked to aerostat-borne ra-
dars, for example, could both defend coastlines and inhibit
an adversary’s naval movements. cDEFENSE30 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY/NOVEMBER 3/10, 2014 AviationWeek.com/awst
F-35A combat radius
(600 nm.) from
refueling pointF-35A combat radius
(600 nm.) from
refueling pointF-22 combat radius
(410 nm.) from
refueling pointF-22 combat radius
(410 nm.) from
refueling pointSafe Tanker
Standoff DistanceSafe Tanker
Standoff DistanceAndersen AFB
(Guam)Andersen AFB
(Guam)Su-27/30/J-11combat radius
(800 nm.)Su-27/30/J-11combat radius
(800 nm.)PL-12 rangePL-12 range(60 nm.)(60 nm.)Source: Center for Strategic and Budgetary AssessmentsA central premise of the CSBA report is that
short-range fi ghters will be excluded from some
confl icts by their reliance on vulnerable tank-
ers and adversary development of long-range
interceptors.T
he proposed new Pentagon strategy is called Third Of set be-
cause it is considered as important as two previous strategic
changes that took advantage of U.S. technological leadership to
overcome operational challenges: President Dwight D. Eisen-
hower’s “new look” in the 1950s, which relied on nuclear weapons
to of set Soviet force numbers, and the “of set strategy” pursued
by Defense Secretary Harold Brown in the late 1970s, which com-
bined precision weapons with new reconnaissance systems to
disrupt potential Warsaw Pact aggression in Europe.
Robert Work introduced the term Third Of set in a speech
to the National Defense University in August, and the concept
was endorsed by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel a month later,
when he announced that he had directed Work to craft a new
strategy aimed at countering Russian and Chinese weapon de-
velopments.
Third Of set is based on deterrence, rather than being aimed
at restoring the status quo, by driving adversary forces back after
a confl ict has started. Deterrence takes two forms: “denial,” or
preventing the adversary from being confi dent that his plans will
work; and “punishment,” or the ability to damage high-value tar-
gets whether or not they are directly used in the confl ict.
The CSBA report identifi es four specifi c operational chal-
lenges to the classic approach to power projection, which is
based on the rapid forward deployment of large air, naval and
THIRD TIME AROUND land forces. The challenges result from technology developed by
Russia, China and some less-advanced industries.
First, regional bases, including airfi elds and ports required to
keep ships fueled, are vulnerable to attack by guided missiles.
Second, the means to track naval forces at sea, at long range,
are becoming more af ordable and harder to defeat. Third, non-
stealthy aircraft are vulnerable to better air defense systems.
Fourth, space is no longer a sanctuary where surveillance and
communications assets can operate unprotected.
Some of these challenges are hard to defeat by traditional
means (such as interceptor-based missile defense) because of
economics. The report states that the Navy’s SM-3 Block IB
interceptor missile costs $10-12 million per round and the new
Block IIA twice as much, while China’s DF-21D anti-ship ballis-
tic missile is estimated at $5-10 million. Also, each interceptor
displaces an of ensive weapon from a ship.
Against those challenges, Third Of set proposes to exploit
the U.S. lead in specifi c areas where analysts—including Work’s
key advisers—believe that it will be hardest for adversaries to
develop ef ective countermeasures. These include unmanned
systems; transitioning to autonomous weapons using “machine
learning” or artifi cial intelligence to become more autonomous;
long-range air operations; extreme low observables across all
bands and aspect angles; undersea warfare of all kinds; and the
integration of very large-scale systems of systems. c圀漀爀氀搀䴀愀最猀⸀渀攀琀圀漀爀氀搀䴀愀最猀⸀渀攀琀
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