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COMMENT

flightglobal.com 17-23 February 2015 | Flight International | 9

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D

espite the statistics suggesting that flying is as safe

as it has ever been, it feels increasingly fragile with

every passing accident.

Setting aside the violent shootdown of Malaysia Air-

lines flight MH17 and the surreal disappearance of

MH370 last year – which are enough on their own to

unsettle many air travellers – the airlines’ fragility is

showing up mostly in their pilots.

According to another set of equally valid statistics,

these square-jawed, steely-eyed alpha males and fe-

males are increasingly unable to handle the routine up-

sets they are there to deal with: events their forebears

managed without fuss in the days not so long ago when

machinery was much less reliable.

It is hard to imagine the Taiwan Aviation Safety

Council finding the TransAsia ATR 72-600 crash to

have been caused by something other than the crew,

by mistake, shutting down the good engine when the

other one failed. The nation’s civil aviation authority

has ordered pilot testing and retraining accordingly.

Because the 112 years since the first powered flight

is, in human evolutionary terms, of zero significance,

Charles Darwin might suggest the reason why modern

pilots often fail is related to a changing environment.

He’d be half right: things are changing, mostly for the

better, but it is today’s failure to train pilots to resilience

instead of to licence minimums that is the problem. ■

Where have the steely-eyed pilots gone?

A

s Bombardier reshuffles its leadership and seeks to

contain a financial crisis, it is time to consider how

things could have gone so wrong for the Canadian

manufacturer.

Bombardier cancelled its BRJ-X project almost 14

years ago. That was an Embraer E-Jet-sized aircraft with

engines mounted below the wings, which is an ideal

configuration for stretching. Instead, it launched

further stretches of the CRJ-700, in the -900 and-1000.

Had it kept the BRJ going, the company would have

had the option of launching an E2-style rewinging and

re-enginging activity, rather than encroach on Airbus’s

and Boeing’s turf with the larger CSeries.

In 2008, it was also widely believed that Airbus and

Boeing would launch clean-sheet aircraft to replace

their A320 and 737. Ironically, Bombardier may have

inadvertently set in motion the demise of such designs

by launching the CSeries with Pratt & Whitney’s geared

turbofan engine. That helped convince Airbus in 2010

to re-engine the A320 with the same technology,

triggering a re-engined response from Boeing.

Retrospective vision is always perfect, but it should

have been clear even in 2008 that the opportunity cost

posed by the CSeries was too high for Bombardier.

Since the early 1990s, Bombardier’s aerospace

division had prided itself on maintaining a balanced

portfolio in three major segments. But keeping that

broad portfolio competitive and intact proved impossi-

ble after the CSeries started absorbing the majority of the

aerospace division’s research and development budget.

Had Bombardier not launched the CSeries, the CRJ

would likely still be winding down as Embraer’s E-Jet E

family came into service. However, it would have been

able to launch a 90-seater to follow the Q400.

Learjet also would have struggled with the extended

sales depression in the light jet segment, but its owner

would have had the capital to invest sooner in a

response to the G650. Instead, Gulfstream will have the

market to itself for at least five years until the Global

7000 enters service.

Boeing arguably made more expensive mistakes on

the 787, but it could afford to with ample cash flowing

in from the 737 and 777 programmes. Bombarder’s

products are not lucrative enough to offset climbing

CSeries development costs. The 787 also enjoys being

in a popular segment of the market, with more than

1,000 aircraft already sold.

The CSeries was simply a mistake that Bombardier

could not afford to make. ■

See This Week P

It should have been clear that

the opportunity cost posed by

the CSeries was too high

Rex Features

Bombardier also backed the wrong horse

Had it held firm with developing the BRJ more than a decade ago, Canada’s now embattled

aerospace champion could have been sitting pretty. It must be regretting its CSeries gamble

A disastrous bet

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