By Pierre SparacoFormer Paris Bureau Chief
Pierre Sparaco has covered
aviation and aerospace
since the 1960s.T
his year, Dassault Aviation is scheduled to deliver one Falcon
business jet—or more—per week to customers around theworld. In contrast, a maximum of 11 Rafale fighters will be pro-
duced, including three for Egypt. Statistics like these confirm that
the French group is no longer a major military player. However,
the situation could change rapidly if export contracts currently
being discussed become firm. India is planning to order 126 Ra-
fales, including 26 to be produced by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.
Potential short-term customers include Qatar.
The 11 Rafales being built this year
represent the bare minimum needed to
keep the final assembly line alive. The
customer’s goal is to gradually replace
seven aircraft types with one all-en-
compassing aircraft to harmonize the
inventory and cut operational costs.
By opting for this route, the French
government has reached a position
where it wants Dassault to compete
on the export market against the U.S.,
Russia and other nations—but at the
same time it has hindered the Rafale’s
export potential.
This is why the manufacturer
encountered difculties in concluding
its first orders abroad. The Rafale, to
some extent, is too sophisticated and
expensive.
But that is not the only problem
Dassault faces. Government budget
constraints have taken a severe toll on
the military procurement plan, jeopar-
dizing the nation’s ambitious defense
strategy. The air force now operates
fewer aircraft than ever while multiple
overseas operations—in distant coun-
tries such as Mali—are mounting.
In other words, President Francois
Hollande’s political ambitions have per-
haps become so extensive and expen-
sive that they are creating a complexproblem within the defense industry.
Dassault, which was a top player in the
1970s with its Mirage air-superiority
fighter and attack aircraft, is now re-
stricted to a one-aircraft-type candi-
date. Moreover, no national program is
being planned post-Rafale.
The Dassault Neuron—an experi-
mental stealth unmanned combat air
vehicle—is no more than a European
technology demonstrator. It could
be followed by an Anglo-French
unmanned aerial vehicle involving a
relatively modest workload for produc-
tion facilities that now devote most of
their military business to the Rafale.
Ultimately, Dassault could be relegated
to the role of civil aircraft maker.
No such plan is being contemplated
at this stage, but company executives
may have no other option. Many years
ago, long before the low-cost concept
was in play, preliminary studies con-
sidered the merits of a “cheap” fighter
based on the Super Etendard—acarrier jet. But the idea produced little
interest, mostly because Dassault did
not fully grasp the potential of such a
market.
Dassault, a highly profitable compa-
ny, has another option—using company
funds to develop an all-new aircraft
that could open new market opportuni-
ties. Inspiration could come from the
U.S. Textron group: It recently created
jointly with AirLand Enterprises the
Scorpion light attack and intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)
jet aircraft. The Scorpion is expected
to cost $3,000 or so per flight hour to
operate, in contrast with as much as
$24,000 for in-production fighters.
However, although a possible submis-
sion to the air force is being considered,
no request for proposals has been
mentioned at this point.
In the next few years, Dassault will
have to either mold itself into a purely
civil player or adopt a new strategy to
stay in the military game. cTextron and AirLand Enterprises
jointly developed the low-cost
Scorpion, which will cost no
more than $3,000 per flight
hour to operate, according to the
manufacturers. It will be displayed
at the Paris air show in June.Dassault’s Dilemma
French aircraft manufacturer faces crucial
turning point in its future direction
COMMENTARYReality Check
AviationWeek.com/awst AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY/MARCH 30-APRIL 12, 2015 23
TEXTRON