The Washington Post - USA (2022-05-25)

WEDNESDAY, MAY 25 , 2022. THE WASHINGTON POST EZ RE A21

WEDNESDAY Opinion

B

iden administration officials

know they need to do something

to contain China’s growing eco-

nomic influence in Asia. That

something probably involves encourag-

ing other, friendlier Asian countries to do

more business with the United States

rather than China. Unfortunately, the

Biden team also thinks that the usual

measures required to give these friends

more access to the U.S. market — such as

cutting tariffs — are too politically toxic.

So they decided to split the baby: a

developing trade deal that will somehow

not involve much (if any) trade

l iberalization.

In a splashy announcement Monday,

President Biden and leaders from

12 other countries unveiled the “Indo-

Pacific Economic Framework for Pros-

perity.” This “framework,” really the start

of longer-term negotiations, is intended

to strengthen ties with Asian-Pacific

countries tired of being bullied by China.

We have some catching up to do on

this front. Many of those 12 “partner”

countries are still annoyed by Donald

Trump’s erratic trade policies. Among

them was his decision to pull out of a

previous trade pact, negotiated under

the Obama administration, that had

largely the same geopolitical objectives

as this new “framework”: creating an

economic alliance to counter China.

Biden officials are taking pains to mes-

sage that this is not like that other, cursed

trade deal, the Trans-Pacific Partnership,

which lawmakers in Biden’s own party

had opposed even before Trump killed it.

Moreover, it’s like no previous trade deal,

period, the administration stresses.

“This framework is intentionally de-

signed not to be a ‘same old, same old’

traditional trade agreement,” Commerce

Secretary Gina Raimondo told reporters

in a conference call with media members.

So, what’s different this time? Well,

there are no plans to lower tariffs or

otherwise guarantee those 12 partner

countries broader access to the coveted

U.S. market. There are also no plans to

guarantee U.S. exporters reciprocal ac-

cess to these other countries’ valuable

markets, which U.S. firms want.

Liberalization of trade is typically a

core element of trade agreements. But as

with other economic questions, the

Biden administration has apparently de-

cided to defer to the Trump worldview,

and assume that tariff repeal of any kind

is too politically dangerous to attempt.

So, instead, the framework has four

“pillars” on which participating coun-

tries will confer: supply chain resiliency,

digital economy rules, clean energy and

infrastructure, and taxation and anti-

corruption.

These all sound like critical areas for

international coordination, and I hope

negotiations are successful. But there

are reasons to be skeptical about how

much this trans-Pacific partnership

(which is, again, nothing like that other

Trans-Pacific Partnership) can achieve.

One is that the negotiations are a la

carte; participating countries can opt out

on any of those four “pillars,” which are

already somewhat vague.

“This is, according to [administration

officials], more ‘flexible’ and more ‘inno-

vative,’” says Mary E. Lovely, senior fel-

low at the Peterson Institute for Interna-

tional Economics. “Well, what does that

mean? It also means that it’s completely

right now ill-defined, undefined.”

Additionally, it’s not clear what the

possible enforcement mechanisms will

be, particularly if (as White House offi-

cials have said) the administration hopes

to work toward an agreement that won’t

ultimately require congressional sign-off.

This is a practical choice: Congress

refused to ratify the Trans-Pacific Part-

nership after years of negotiations.

Working toward a different deal crafted

to not be contingent on fickle lawmakers’

assent might make an eventual agree-

ment more likely. But it also makes any

new deal more likely to be toothless.

Most important, without offering any

additional access to U.S. markets, it’s not

clear how much we can incentivize other

countries to make changes that will be

costly to them, particularly in the short

term.

For example, cutting cheaper Chinese

inputs out of their supply chains or creat-

ing separate production lines just for the

U.S. market would be expensive. With-

out the promise of greater access to

U.S. consumers, these kinds of invest-

ments might not be worthwhile.

In an interview, a senior administra-

tion official said that other, non-tariff-

based incentives are being offered to

stoke cooperation. Carrots being dan-

gled, the official said, include “more reli-

able access to U.S. capital” and the pros-

pect of “harmonized” rules surrounding

complex digital issues such as intellectu-

al property and data privacy. That way

foreign firms can more easily “under-

stand when and in what context they can

provide services to the U.S. economy.”

“Reducing tariffs is more familiar, so

when you think about other benefits,

those might feel more speculative,” the

official said. But, this person added,

those other incentives might nonethe-

less prove attractive.

Perhaps. The problem, though, is that

these countries have explicitly said they

want greater market access. Plus, many

of these non-tariff-based incentives

would also require acts of Congress.

Which the administration has tacitly

suggested should not be counted on.

The only thing that can reliably be

counted on, it appears: a growing politi-

cal aversion to anything branded as “free

trade.”

CATHERINE RAMPELL

Biden’s trade framework misses

key points about, well, trade

JONATHAN ERNST/REUTERS

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, President Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi attend the

Indo-Pacific Economic Framework launch event on May 23.

F

or the third time in his presiden-

cy, Joe Biden has declared that

the United States will defend Tai-

wan if it is invaded by Communist

China. And for the third time in his

presidency, his staff has undermined

him by walking back his comments and

insisting that Biden did not say what he

plainly said.

Which raises an important question:

Who elected them?

At a news conference in Tokyo on

Monday, Biden was asked: “You didn’t

want to get involved in the Ukraine

conflict militarily for obvious reasons.

Are you willing to get involved militarily

to defend Taiwan, if it comes to that?”

Biden replied: “Yes.” The reporter asked

again: “You are?” Biden was unequivo-

cal: “That’s the commitment we made.”

He added: “The idea that [Taiwan] can be

taken by force, just taken by force, is just

not appropriate.” He said the same thing

last August, when he told ABC’s George

Stephanopoulos, “We made a sacred

commitment to Article 5 that if in fact

anyone were to invade or take action

against our NATO allies, we would re-

spond. Same with Japan, same with

South Korea, same with Taiwan.” And in

October, after he was asked by CNN’s

Anderson Cooper if “the United States

would come to Taiwan’s defense if China

attacked,” Biden answered forthrightly:

“Yes, we have a commitment to do that.”

Now that Biden has said not once, not

twice, but three times that he would

order the U.S. military to defend Taiwan,

one begins to suspect that it was not a

gaffe — and that he actually meant what

he said.

But instead of falling in line, his staff

went into cleanup mode, insisting there

had been no change in policy. Unfortu-

nately, they appear to have persuaded

Biden to back off as well. Asked the next

day if the policy of strategic ambiguity

toward Taiwan was “dead,” Biden an-

swered “no,” adding that “the policy has

not changed at all.” This makes no sense.

He said he would defend Taiwan if it

were attacked. There was nothing “am-

biguous” about what he said.

Biden was right the first time — and

the second and third time, too. One of the

reasons Russian President Vladimir Pu-

tin chose to invade Ukraine but not, say,

Poland, Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia, is

because those countries enjoy some-

thing Ukraine does not: an Article 5

commitment. Putin knows an attack on

them would be declaring war not just on

them but also on the United States and

the NATO alliance — and that knowledge

is a powerful deterrent.

If we are to deter China from invading

Taiwan, then we must be equally clear

about the response it would face. This is

why many foreign policy experts have

been arguing for the clarity that Biden

offered this week. Richard Haass, presi-

dent of the Council on Foreign Relations,

co-authored a Foreign Affairs essay in

2020 that declared: “The policy known

as strategic ambiguity has... r un its

course. Ambiguity is unlikely to deter an

increasingly assertive China with grow-

ing military capabilities. The time has

come for the United States to introduce a

policy of strategic clarity: one that makes

explicit that the United States would

respond to any Chinese use of force

against Taiwan.” And as my American

Enterprise Institute colleagues Gary

Schmitt and Michael Mazza also pointed

out in 2020, “China’s increasingly threat-

ening posture vis-à-vis Taiwan has elicit-

ed a growing view among Americans and

American politicians that ‘strategic am-

biguity’ has outlived its usefulness.”

Biden was right to ditch ambiguity for

clarity — his backtracking notwithstand-

ing. But clarity alone is not enough. We

also need to have the right capabilities in

the region to back up our new deterrence

posture. Whereas Ukraine has a long,

porous border with Russia, Taiwan is an

island. China needs to cross the Taiwan

Strait to reach it. So we must deploy

weapons — including intermediate-

range conventional missiles, armed

drones and anti-ship weapons in Guam,

Japan and the Philippines — that would

allow us to prevent China from doing so.

We can do that thanks to Donald Trump’s

2019 decision to withdraw from the In-

termediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

If Chinese leaders know we can stop their

forces from ever reaching Taiwan, they

will be less likely to launch an attack.

We also need to make sure Taiwan has

the weapons to defend itself. The Trump

administration approved historic de-

fense sales to Taiwan, totaling over

$18 billion in four years — more than his

predecessor provided in eight years —

including F-16 fighter jets, Abrams tanks,

Stinger antiaircraft missiles, antiship

missiles, torpedoes and Reaper drones.

Biden needs to expand those sales even

further. Unlike what played out in

Ukraine, we must arm Taiwan before an

invasion to deter one. We need to ask

ourselves: If China invaded tomorrow,

what capabilities would we wish we had

provided Taipei — and then provide

those weapons now.

Most important, Biden’s staff needs to

stop undermining deterrence by under-

mining the president. Biden was 100 per-

cent correct: If China invades Taiwan, we

must come to its defense. Better that

China know that now, before an invasion

— so we can prevent one from happening

in the first place.

MARC A. THIESSEN

That’s three flip-flops on defending Taiwan

Y

ou might call it a disastrous “Octo-

ber surprise” for Democrats in this

year’s crucial midterm campaign —

except it wouldn’t be a surprise at

all, and it is completely avoidable.

The governing party’s inability thus far

to reach some kind of agreement on a

scaled-back version of President Biden’s

Build Back Better legislation is raising a

real possibility that millions of middle-

class Americans will see their health insur-

ance costs go up by hundreds of dollars per

month next year. And if it happens, they

will hear the news about it just weeks

before Election Day.

That’s because the temporary subsidies

for people who buy their coverage through

the Affordable Care Act exchanges — assis-

tance that was provided in last year’s mas-

sive covid-19 relief package — are sched-

uled to expire at the end of 2022. The stalled

BBB legislation would provide an exten-

sion of the subsidies.

The exchanges were set up for people

who do not receive health insurance

through their jobs or government pro-

grams such as Medicare and Medicaid.

They include early retirees, gig workers and

others who are self-employed, as well as

people employed by small businesses that

do not offer group coverage. In its original

version, the 2010 health-care law provided

premium assistance only to households

earning between 100 percent and 400 per-

cent of the poverty level.

In 2021, the American Rescue Plan Act

made temporary premium assistance avail-

able to an estimated 3.7 million additional

people, mostly with incomes between four

and six times the poverty level, according to

the Kaiser Family Foundation. This new help

for those whose incomes previously were too

high to qualify for assistance is a major

reason that a record 14.5 million Americans

signed up to get health coverage this year

through Obamacare marketplaces, passing

the previous peak by nearly 2 million.

How much benefit have people been re-

ceiving from those subsidies? Again, some

figures from Kaiser: They are enough to

cover more than half the annual $11,000

premiums for a relatively low-deductible

“silver” plan for a 60-year-old making just

over $51,000, or about four times the pover-

ty level. Without the assistance, the month-

ly premium paid this year by a couple over

the age of 50 earning $75,000 would go up

by close to $700, bringing their plan’s total

cost to more than $1,200 a month.

So losing those subsidies would be a big

hit for people who make a living wage but

are far from wealthy. And that is not all they

are likely to face when the annual signup

for the Obamacare exchanges rolls around.

Because hospitals are paying significantly

higher labor and other costs, insurance

premiums are expected to rise by double

digits next year.

That kind of sticker shock will force many

people to buy plans with lower coverage or

higher deductibles and other out-of-pocket

costs. They might be priced out of the health

insurance market entirely.

All of this should add some urgency to

the seemingly moribund negotiations be-

tween the White House and Democrats on

Capitol Hill to figure out which parts of the

president’s original multitrillion-dollar

proposal to transform the U.S. economy

might still be salvageable. (The Congres-

sional Budget Office estimates that extend-

ing the temporary subsidies for people who

purchase insurance on the health-care ex-

changes would cost about $210 billion over

the next decade.)

Time is running out, and Democrats may

not get a second chance if they blow this

opportunity. Republicans, should they take

over one or both chambers after this fall’s

elections, are unlikely to shore up the ACA,

which they detest. “Members of Congress —

particularly Democrats — are not acting

like this is a crisis. They can fix this,” Chris

Jennings, who was a top health-care advis-

er in both the Clinton and Obama adminis-

trations, told me.

Extending the subsidies would require a

simple majority under the Senate’s budget

reconciliation rules. The frustratingly

opaque Sen. Joe Manchin III (D-W.Va.) re-

mains the pivotal vote, but there is reason

to believe he would not be an obstacle. He

has been a supporter of the Affordable Care

Act and generally expressed openness to

measures that would lower health-care

costs, including by allowing Medicare to

negotiate prescription drug prices, which is

another provision of the Biden agenda and

something Democrats have promised for

many years.

Democrats, even with their narrow ma-

jorities in the House and Senate, can still

get a few things over the finish line. Pre-

venting an entirely foreseeable explosion in

health-care costs should be one of them.

KAREN TUMULTY

Dems have a

ticking time

bomb: Costs

for health care

Without the assistance, the

monthly premium paid this

year by a couple over the age

of 50 earning $75,000 would

go up by close to $700.

J

ust how dark can “Dark MAGA” get?
Donald Trump and one of his prom-
inent acolytes have just shone some
light on the matter.
On Sunday, amid a growing num-
ber of signs that he has lost his hot hand in
Republican primaries, Trump elevated
the idea of “civil war” against an “enemy
[coming] from within” the United States.
Republican leaders responded, as usual,
with silence.
On Monday, the Trump-endorsed can-
didate for governor in Georgia, former
senator David Perdue, closed out his flail-
ing campaign for the Republican nomina-
tion by stripping off the mask and letting
fly a starkly racist finale: He said the
(Black) Democratic gubernatorial candi-
date, Stacey Abrams, is “demeaning her
own race” and should “go back where she
came from.”
The back-to-back appeals to violence
and white supremacy provide a caution to
those celebrating Trump’s apparent loss
of his kingmaker status in Republican
politics: As ugly as things have been with
Trump holding an iron grip over the GOP,
they could actually get worse if he feels
his grasp slipping and becomes even
more incendiary in his provocations.
Trump on Sunday used his own hapless
media company, Truth Social, to share a
screenshot of a tweet from Salvadoran
president (and Trump ally) Nayib Bukele
saying of the United States: “Something
so big and powerful can’t be destroyed so
quickly, unless the enemy comes from
within.” Trump “ReTruthed” that mes-
sage, along with the two-word commen-
tary a Truth Social user had appended to
it: “Civil war.”

Trump, who has long idolized Robert
E. Lee and championed memorials for
Confederate leaders, wasn’t clear about
whether his sharing of the message was
meant to recommend, or merely to pre-
dict, a civil war. Neither did the aspiring
Jefferson Davis share what he found en-
ticing about the prospect.
Was it the mass death? A repeat of the
mortality of the Civil War would mean
about 8 million deaths today. Or was it
the Lost Cause mythology, which gave
birth to Jim Crow and today’s white
supremacy?
But this much is perfectly clear: Trump
was, once again, amplifying a favorite
theme of the violent far right.
The Oath Keepers, the right-wing mili-
tant group now being prosecuted for
sedition for its role in the Jan. 6 insurrec-
tion, has long had the civil-war idea at the
heart of its ideology. “We aren’t getting
through this without a civil war,” the
group’s leader, Stewart Rhodes, wrote
before the insurrection, according to
court filings. The leader of the group’s
Arizona chapter posted a video claiming
that Rep. Paul Gosar (R-Ariz.) told the
chapter that the country is already in a
civil war.
The casual expectation of violence is
spreading. Pennsylvania Republicans last
week chose as their gubernatorial nomi-
nee Doug Mastriano, a state senator who
marched on the Capitol on Jan. 6 and who
wrote his master’s thesis on the need for
the military to protect the country from a
“Hitlerian Putsch” by the left, The Post’s
Greg Jaffe reported. And Rep. Madison
Cawthorn (R-N.C.), who had previously
warned of “bloodshed” if elections “con-
tinue to be rigged,” said after losing his
primary last week: “It’s time for Dark
MAGA to truly take command” over the
“cowardly and weak members of our own
party. Their days are numbered. We are
coming.”
Then there’s Rep. Marjorie Taylor
Greene (R-Ga.), of course, who has spoken
of a secession-style “national divorce” as a
civil-war alternative, and of using “our
Second Amendment rights... t o defend
ourselves from a tyrannical government.”
Precisely because of such people, the
United States actually is at risk of civil
war — more than at any point in recent
history. As I have noted, the Trump presi-
dency and the Capitol insurrection
caused the country to lose its status as a
“full democracy” for the first time since
1800, according to an index used by the
CIA to track instability and political vio-
lence abroad. A partial democracy, which
the United States now is, faces three times
the risk of falling into civil war.
That was true before Trump began
amplifying talk about war against an
enemy within; before Fox News’s Tucker
Carlson, House Republican Conference
Chair Elise Stefanik (N.Y.) and others
promoted the “great replacement” con-
spiracy theory allegedly used to justify
last week’s racist massacre in Buffalo; and
before Perdue, on his way to likely defeat,
told his White audience that Abrams was
“demeaning” her race.
Trump and Perdue are the ones de-
meaning their race — the human race.
After Buffalo, they know exactly where
these words lead, and yet, even now, they
choose to escalate.

DANA MILBANK

Kingmaker

status in doubt,

Trump is more

dangerous

The casual expectation

of violence is spreading.