FOR RECREATIONAL PILOTS. Sport Pilot^53

There would be few instructors out there who would argue with me if I said there are no new ways to kill yourself. In light aviation, the recurrence of vari-

ous accident types seems to happen with almost boring regularity. The next three articles will deal specifically with the BIG 3 killers in light aviation:

1 Engine failure after take-off 2 Turning base stall 3 VFR into IMC

EFATO

I know what you are thinking - Oh no, not an-

other article on engine failure after take-off. Yes

yes, we all know - Lower the nose, land straight

ahead, right? Once the student reaches a cer-

tain stage in their training, all instructors seem

to relish pulling the power off at 200ft and urg-

ing them to get the nose down.

I’m sure every pilot, during their initial flight

test, gets a few of these and, without fail, will

dutifully lower the nose and say ‘that one’ as

they point to a clear area or paddock.

In just the same way we teach almost

parrot-like reactions to stalling, the stu-

dent gets to know what he’s meant

to do and when he’s meant to do it.

So why then are we still seeing

EFATO’s end badly? Why are pilots

still yanking the turn on and trying

to get home when the band stops

playing?

There is no one simple answer,

but clearly we are missing some-

thing, somewhere. We can train

pilots to fly perfectly, accurately, on

the numbers and to exercise good

judgement in a variety of situations.

Why then can’t we train out of them the

urge to turn back?

One of the biggest factors is the human

element and when I say human, I mean the

ancient human who lives deep down in all of

us who used to get chased by sabre toothed

tigers and other nasties. When a human being

perceives a threat to his/her safety, a series

of rapid and incredibly strong physiological

changes take place in a fraction of a second.

Some of the these changes are:

• pulse rate increases;


• pupils dilate to let in more light;


• hearing becomes much more sensitive;


• adrenalin is released into the bloodstream
  to help you turn and run or stand and fight.
  It’s an instinct as old as humanity itself,
  and when the proverbial hits the fan, the hu-
  man being does things he/she would normally
  not even consider, or in this case, things he
  knows he should not do.

The second thing to consider is the aero-

dynamics. Question. What is the most crucial

of the four forces in a climb? If you answered

lift, you are not entirely correct. Thrust is what

makes an aeroplane climb (or more accurate-

ly, an excess of thrust). When thrust is sud-

denly removed from the equation, the aero-

plane will almost instantly stop climbing and,

with no change to the attitude, this results in

an increased angle of attack. In those crucial

few seconds after the band stops playing,

while you are busy succumbing to your primal

instinct to run away from the tiger, the aero-

plane is rapidly:

a) decelerating;

b) increasing the angle of attack (because

you are just holding the nose in the same posi-

tion) which also increases drag; and

c) descending.

To now ask the aeroplane to turn rapidly

at a high angle of bank is simply too much.

The science runs out of puff and the wing can

no longer sustain the last morsels of lift. The

result is a rapid increase in the descent, fol-

lowed by a stall and spin.

What can we do to avoid this deadly situ-

ation?

Again, there’s no simple answer, but we as

instructors need to address both the human

and performance elements. An excellent tool (if

used properly) is the pre take-off safety brief.

This simple, short speech given before the

throttle is opened should help reduce the time

spent in fright mode, and also give the pilot

an action or procedure to go to.

But the brief alone is not enough.

We must constantly drum in not the

notion that the engine might fail,

but rather the notion that it is al-

ways about to fail. Simple, subtle

patter such as “where are we go-

ing to land when the engine fails”,

as opposed to “if” the engine

fails, will help build the picture.

The idea is to get the student to

take off thinking he is about to land

in the paddock straight ahead every

time. The pilot needs to develop the

normal procedure to fly from landing

area to landing area during the climb out.

This technique may give him/her an extra

second or two of cognitive function after the

engine fails because they will simply activate

a plan already in the mind rather then having to

make a new decision to land ahead.

At this crucial stage, options can be consid-

ered, such as taking flap, delaying flap, side-

slipping or manoeuvring to avoid objects. The

pilot should have brain space left to execute

these injury saving manoeuvres. A good un-

derstanding of how flap and slipping etc affect

the descent rate is absolutely paramount.

Once on crosswind, the option to return to

the field can be considered. It should be point-

ed out that even then, the field may not be the

best option.

An engine failure does not result in a stall

and spin, only the pilot can make that happen.

NEXT MONTH Turning Base stall

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Professor Avius

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BIG

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