May 2015 FLYPAST 43‘Zones d’Operations’: north, east,
south and southeast. The basic
operational unit was the groupe,
which comprised two escadrilles.
Two or more groupes – later
changed to groupements – formed
an escadre (see panel on page 44).
Eight days before the outbreak
of war it was announced that
the re-equipment of the fighter
and reconnaissance force was
complete; bomber units remained
unchanged while observation
units faced an unspecified delay.PHONEY WAR
Had the Germans invaded France
on September 3, 1939, when it
declared war, instead of May 10,
1940, the impact on the French AirForce would have been catastrophic.
Notwithstanding the re-equipment
programme, there was disagreement
as to the size of the force required.
It was possible for manufacturers
to supply up to 600 aircraft a
month, but to maintain and operate
them was beyond the means of the
air force’s infrastructure and it was
believed that up to 60 per a month
was more realistic.
The first recorded air combat
between the Luftwaffe and the
French Air Force occurred on
September 8, 1939 when six
Curtiss H-75As of Groupe de
chasse (GC) II/4 encountered
four Messerschmitt Bf 109s and
claimed to have shot down two.
The German unit is assumed tohave been 1 Staffel/Jagdgeschwader
53 (1/JG 53) as its Staffelkapitän,
Hptm Werner Mölders, was injured
when he force-landed back in
Germany. There were no other
Luftwaffe losses.
Later that day, the first German
victory occurred when Lt Gutbrod
of 5/JG 52 shot down a Mureaux
115 of Groupe aériens d’observation
(GAO) 553 near Karlsruhe,
killing both French crew. The first
confirmed French victory came
on September 20 when Sgt André
Legrand of GC II/5 shot down a
Bf 109 of 3/JG 53 west of Merzig,
Germany, mortally wounding Uffz
Martin Winkler. Skirmishes such as
these continued for the remainder of
1939 and into early 1940.
For the French it was Drôle de
Guerre – or, for the British, the
‘Phoney War’ – and a vital breathing
space. The French Air Force
managed to increase the combat-
ready figures, but disconnects and
in-fighting between government,
military and industry led to a lack of
doctrine, strategy and tactics.
Despite the rising numbers of
aircraft being delivered, many were
not combat-ready when Germany
invaded. A large number were
in crates or dispersed at remote
airfields and lacking equipment,
including radios and guns. Radios
were generally unreliable and
bombers’ and fighters’ frequencies
were different so they could not
communicate in the air.SWIMMING
AGAINST THE TIDE
CHRIS GOSS DESCRIBES HOW THE FRENCH AIR FORCE
PREPARED FOR, AND MET, THE LUFTWAFFE’S BLITZKRIEG
GuerreGuerre
‘Phoney War’ – and a vital breathing
space. The French Air Force
managed to increase the combat-
ready figures, but disconnects and
in-fighting between government,
military and industry led to a lack of
doctrine, strategy and tactics. doctrine, strategy and tactics.Above, left to right
Obf Heinz Grimmling
of 1/JG 53 shot down
a Bloch 131 of GR 14
near Saarbrücken on
September 9, 1939.Uffz Heinrich Bezner
of 1/JG 53 shot down a
Mureaux 115 of GAO 1/520
on September 10, 1939, for
which he was awarded the
Iron Cross Second Class.A Potez 390 of GAO 510
which was damaged in
combat on May 10, 1940
only to be destroyed on
the ground afterwards.A Breguet 693 of GBA
II/54 – which is believed
to have been shot down
by Fw Erich Rudorffer of
2/JG 2 while attacking
enemy transport on May
25, 1940 – crash-landed
near Cerisy.Left
The graves of Lt Jean
Sueur and Capitaine Jean
Rossignol of GAO 3/551
whose Mureaux 117 was
shot down by fl ak near
Trassem, Germany, on
September 11, 1939.42-44_Blitzkrieg_fpSBB.indd 43 13/03/2015 10:12