The Economist - UK (2022-05-28)

4 SpecialreportChinainAfrica TheEconomistMay28th 2022

forinter­agencyco­operationinWashington.GlobalGatewayis

vanishinglyslightindetail.ButthebiggerfailingintheWest’s

viewofChina­Africaisconceptual.Attimesit reducesChina’srole

tothatofa giantconstructioncompany.Andwhennotsimplify­

ing,theWestexaggerates,ascribingmorecalculationtoBeijing

thanit deserves,asinbroadandmisleadingaccusationsthatit de­

liberatelypursues“debt­trapdiplomacy”.

ThetendencyistoseeeventsinAfricaaspartofa great­power

game.SomethingsChinadoeswarrantconcern(buildingmilitary

bases,monopolisingcobaltmining).Butothersdonot(building

airports,sellingmobilephones).Africanpoliticiansdislikebeing

patronisedandarescepticaloftheWest’smotives.Africanleaders

wantit understoodthattheyoftenhavenooptionbuttodealwith

China,whichtheydowiththeireyesopen.

MostAfricansthinkhighlyofChina.Asurveyof 34 African

countrieslastyearbyAfrobarometer,a researchgroup,foundthat

63%ofrespondentsfeltChinahada “very”or“somewhat”positive

influence—morethanthe60%whosaidthesameofAmerica.

PollsinsevenAfricancountriesforTheEconomistbyPremise,con­

ductedinApril,founda similarresult.Ineverycountrymorere­

spondentsfeltthatChinahada “good”thana “bad”influence.

NoneofwhichmeansacceptingChina’spropaganda.Itisnon­

sensetoclaimit ismotivatedbyaltruism.Chinaisruthlesslyself­

interested.Althoughitsmixofcreditandconstructionhasboost­

edgrowth,ithasalsofosteredcorruptionandoftenproppedup

autocracies.SomeChinesefirmsmistreat Africanworkersand

harmecosystems.Itsdiplomatsworktoblockcriticalcoveragein

themediaanddangleaidinreturnforsupportattheun.

AnalystsstressAfrican“agency”indealingswiththeChinese.

Africangovernmentstrytonegotiatebetterdeals,withvarying

success.Butagencycannotobscuretheasymmetryinrelations.

AfricaandChinabothhave1.4bnpeoplebutChinaisa single,bru­

tallydisciplinedone­partystate,anditseconomyaccountsfor

nearly20%ofworldoutput.Africaisa continentof 54 mostly

weakcountries,anditseconomyisworthonly3%oftheworld’s.

ThisspecialreportputsthecaseforunderstandingtheChina­

Africarelationship.Chinawantstoco­opttheglobalsouth.It isef­

fectivein“hardware”—infrastructure,trade,telecoms—buthasa

moremaligninfluenceon“software”—theinstitutionscrucialto

Africa’sfuture.InAfrobarometerpolls,farmore countrieslist

AmericathanChinaastheirpreferredfuturemodel(23against

five).InoursurveyfromPremiseonlytwocountries(Ethiopiaand

Tanzania)sawChinamorefavourablythanAmerica.Putcrudely:

AfricansappreciateChina’seconomicrolebutpreferdemocracy

andfreedomtoauthoritarianism.n

Popularity contest

Africa*, “ What do you think about the economic and political influence of

countries/organisations on your country?”, 2019-21, % responding

Source:Afrobarometer *3 countries surveyed

Russia

Formercolonialpower

Regionalsuperpower

AfricanUnion

Regionalalliance

UNagencies

UnitedStates

China

0 20 40 60 80 100

Somewhat/very negative

Don’t know

Somewhat/very positive

Debt and infrastructure

Roads to somewhere

T

he nairobiexpressway curves 27km (17 miles) through Ken­

ya’s capital. Built by the China Road and Bridge Corporation, a

state­owned  enterprise  (soe),  the  road  will  open  later  this  year.

Under its concrete pillars, Nairobians share their views of it. Sam­

wel Juma, a student, calls it “a project for the future” that will un­

clog traffic jams. But Gabriel Kihoti, a hairdresser, questions why

it was a priority when the cost of food and fuel is surging. Francis

Muriu, a cab­driver, calls it “a road for the rich, not the poor”.

The road symbolises a shift in a key China­Africa relationship:

over debt and infrastructure. In the 2000s and 2010s China’s state­

backed banks lent African governments billions for roads, ports or

airports built by Chinese soes. Some deals, as in Angola and Con­

go, linked repayment to the extraction of natural resources. State­

backed lending has since dwindled, as China seeks new funding

models. The expressway’s tolls, which in theory should pay for the

road, are an example. 

Kenyans’ attitudes reflect lingering ambivalence after two dec­

ades  of  Chinese  construction  across  Africa.  China  says  this  has

been “win­win” for both. African leaders say China was the only

country  willing  to  meet  their  infrastructure  needs.  Critics  argue

that China has built white elephants, fostered corruption and en­

couraged  indebtedness.  New  research  suggests  China  has  been

neither the benevolent partner of propaganda nor the scoundrel

of the West’s imagination. It also shows that Africans can get more

out of the relationship, depending on how they negotiate. 

Like  the  West,  China  substantially  increased  its  development

finance to Africa in the 2000s. Unlike the West, most of it took the

form of loans at or near market rates, rather than aid. From 2000 to

2020  Chinese  state  financiers  lent  $160bn  to  African  govern­

ments.  Whereas  Western  aid  or  World  Bank  lending  is  typically

widely spread around, almost two­thirds of China’s loans to Africa

were  for  infrastructure.  From  2007  to  2020,  Chinese  infrastruc­

ture  financing  for  sub­Saharan  Africa  was  2.5  times  as  big  as  all

other bilateral institutions combined.

In the 2000s African countries had more scope to borrow after

debt relief from rich countries and a commodities boom. An ad­

viser to one leader stresses the shift to multiparty democracy from

the  early  1990s.  “You’re  stuck  with  this  democracy  thing  and

you’re stuck with having to demonstrate to the voting population

what you’re bringing to the table.” The easiest way to do this was to

get China to lend and build.

Yet Western criticisms are often based on misguided assump­

tions.  China  is  a  big  lender  but  rarely  accounts  for  most  African

countries’  debts.  In  2020,  the  most  recent  year  with  good  data,

Chinese loans accounted for 17% of the stock of public debt in sub­

Saharan Africa, says the China Africa Research Initiative (cari) at

Johns Hopkins University in Washington, dc. That was more than

all  other  bilateral  official  creditors  combined,  but  less  than  the

share  held  by  the  World  Bank  (19%)  or  commercial  bondholders

(30%).  In  a  paper  in  2020  cariresearchers  noted  that  China  ac­

counted for more than a quarter of public debt in only seven of 22

countries classified by the imfas suffering “debt distress”.

There is little substance to claims of “debt­trap diplomacy”, in

which China hoodwinks borrowers so as to seize assets. It is more

accurate to say that China’s hard­nosed approach conflicts with its

An era of big loans and big projects is coming to an end.

How did it change Africa?