The Economist May 28th 2022 SpecialreportChinainAfrica 7manufacturing. McKinsey estimates that
12% of Africa’s industrial production is ac
counted for by Chinese companies. Some
manufacturers use Africa as a base for ex
ports, raising hopes of African leaders who
believe that, as Asians get richer, Africa will
lure more labourintensive factories. But
power, labour and logistics are generally
too expensive in Africa. Chinese manufac
turers tend to serve mostly local markets,
rather than export.
In Nigeria Chinese firms are big in the
furniture, ceramics and wig industries.
Some are located in special economic
zones launched by the Nigerian and Chi
nese governments. But many have had little
public help, opting simply to cluster near
Chinese entrepreneurs from the same
province. “We have to do it all ourselves,”
one manufacturer told Yunnan Chen, a re
searcher for cari, in 2020.
And Chinese firms have boosted local
economies. A paper last year by Riccardo
Crescenzi and Nicola Limodio of the Lon
don School of Economics used measures of
nighttime lighting to find a positive im
pact on economic activity in local areas 612
years after an inflow of Chinese fdi. There
is also little truth in the myth that Chinese
firms hire only fellow countrymen. African
employees make up 7095% of Chinese
firms’ workforces, according to a recent
summary of the evidence.
Chinese firms help African ones. Joseph
Ager, who runs a small construction firm in
Nairobi, says Chinese investors are tough
(“There’s no bargaining; they give you the price”) but “understand
us Kenyans”, seeing the need to give cashpoor firms payments in
advance. They have boosted his social mobility, he says. “I’m not
welleducated, I’m a secondborn from a poor family. But I’ve been
able to raise our living standards.”
Much depends on African governments. In Benin, notes a pa
per in April by Folashade Soule of Oxford University, officials dili
gently negotiated a commercial centre for Chinese and local firms
to ensure that its laws had primacy and that Chinese firms used
the centre for wholesale but not retail selling, protecting local
traders. “[The] successful negotiations on the business centre are
an example of how African countries can sometimes exercise
agency despite the asymmetrical nature of their relationships
with China,” says Ms Soule.
Yet not every government can push back. Africans find it hard
to reach senior levels in Chinese companies. In Congo and else
where Chinese miners have fostered poor labour practices. In Ni
geria Chinese cartels in ceramics and wigs have locked out local
competitors. Environmental degradation is common. Tighter reg
ulation of pollution in China, argues an Ethiopian businessman,
is one reason why some Chinese firms move to Africa.
Africans want the Chinese to make things easier for exporters.
Most countries have gaping trade deficits with China. Just three
commodityexporting countries (Angola, Congo and South Africa)
accounted for 62% of Africa’s exports to China in 2021. In Decem
ber, at the triennial forum on ChinaAfrica cooperation in Dakar,
China pledged to raise imports from Africa, which stood at $106bn
in 2021, to $300bn within three years. That will involve “green
lanes” to help agricultural exporters.
The saga of the Kenyan avocado suggests that there is some
substance to this pledge. Chinese fears of imported pests meant
that, until recently, only frozen avocados were allowed in. But ear
lier this year China announced that it would accept fresh ones as
well—expanding the number of potential exporters from two Ken
yan firms with sufficient freezers to more than 100. Tiriku Shah,
who runs a food company, is impressed by the help given by Chi
nese diplomats. “At first they were just helping the Chinese. Now
they help Africans go to China as well.”
Other African products have gained approval, such as Zambian
blueberries and South African lemons. When Beijing imposed ta
riffs of up to 212% on Australian wine after Canberra’s questioning
of the origins of covid19, amVineyards, a South African vintner,
sent Shanghai hundreds of samples, tweaking the blend to find
the right plonk for the Chinese palate. The first bottles arrived in
China late in 2021. The internet allows Chinese consumers to buy
products directly. After Alibaba hosted the Ethiopian ambassador
to Beijing on a shopping livestream, 11,200
coffee bags were sold in a few seconds.
All of which is promising. But the vol
ume of exports remains small. China’s ap
proach to opening up African markets re
mains ad hoc and dependent on lobbying
casebycase. Only one African country,
Mauritius, has a comprehensive freetrade
deal with China. That is a reminder of how,
for Beijing, itspolitical relations with Afri
ca are ultimatelyhigherpriority than its
economic ones.nMauritaniaBurkina
FasoMaliGabonCameroonNigeriaSenegal
TheGambia
Guinea-Bissau GuineaSierraLeone
LiberiaIvory
CoastTo g o
GhanaSãoTomé&Príncipe RwandaCongo-
BrazzavilleNigerCAREquatorialGuineaGulfofGuineaChad Gulf of AdenLibya EgyptTunisiaAlgeriaMoroccoWestern
Sahara
Cape
VerdeKenya
NairobiTigrayFungurume
KolweziUgandaTanzaniaBotswanaSouth
AfricaAngolaZimbabweLesothoEswatini†NamibiaMauritiusSeychellesComorosEthiopiaEritreaD jiboutiSomalia
CongoMadagascar
MozambiqueMalawiBeninSudanZambiaSouth
SudanBurundi500 km →1,000 km ↗DakarSources: MOFCOM; Johns Hopkins University SAID
China Africa Research Initiative; Centre for Strategic
and International Studies; EIU; China Briefing*Builder, operator, funderChinese FDI stock, 2020, $bnChinese projects and infrastructure
2021 or latest availableRailways Completed0.1 0.25 1.0 2.0 3.0Under construction/
plannedSpecial economic zones and industrial parks
Port projects*5.Africans want
the Chinese
to make things
easier for
exporters