The Economist May 28th 2022 Special report China in Africa 9democracy. If voters like Chinesefinanced roads and power
plants, that reduces pressure on political leaders to fix other pro
blems. Many think China’s money corrupts politicians and under
mines democratic norms by coming without the strict conditions
of Western aid. In 2017 a Ghanaian news outlet reported that Chi
na’s embassy had urged a minister to “guide the media” to report
more “objectively” on illegal goldmining, for the sake of bilateral
relations. The letter referred obliquely to “reports and cartoons
that are defaming Chinese leaders”. (Advertising firms have re
fused to put Mr Ackwerh’s work on billboards, with one telling
him they did not want to be dragged into political controversy.)
In authoritarian countries, Chinese diplomats mostly keep
quiet except to praise governments. Before a Tanzanian election in
2020 that was widely seen as neither free nor fair, the Chinese am
bassador praised the electoral system and repeated China’s policy
of “noninterference”. Khalifa Said, an editor at The Chanzo, an in
dependent news site, says Tanzanians have suffered from China’s
refusal to “interfere” and criticise, especially under John Magufu
li, the president who died in 2021. When a newspaper is banned or
an opposition figure disappears, “China does not care,” he says.
“You need people that your government respects, or can listen to,
to say something, to say, ‘no, enough is enough.’ ”
And China is increasingly willing to make political demands of
its own. During the pandemic political leaders were prodded to
declare publicly their gratitude for Chinese munificence in deli
vering vaccines and personal protective equipment. Such transac
tional diplomacy is even starker at the un. Diplomats say that Chi
na has promised aid or financing in return for support at the un,
particularly over its treatment of Uyghurs
in Xinjiang. China threatens reprisals
against any governments that criticise its
humanrights record, and seeks allies in
making the global order more friendly to
autocracy. In June 2021 no African country
backed a critical statement on China at the
un’s humanrights council. Indeed, 34 Af
rican countries signed a counterstate
ment in defence of China.
The numbers suggest that it pays to side
with China. Scholars at AidData have con
ducted a statistical analysis comparing votes in the ungeneral as
sembly between 1999 and 2016 with official financial commit
ments from China. They found that, on average, a 10% increase in
voting alignment with China yielded a 276% increase in aid and
credit. They calculated that, if countries increased their alignment
to Sudan’s level of 93%, the yield would rise further. Cameroon’s
would more than quintuple; Ghana’s would go up by 81%.
That may explain China’s relatively robust support from Afri
can countries at the un. But it also points to the risk of becoming
too reliant on Chinese money. Such funding can easily vanish,
putting a recipient country in a bind. Something like this may be
playing out in Ghana. In 2018 the Ghanaian government struck a
deal with Sinohydro, a Chinese soe, for $2bn in infrastructure pro
jects. But the government hoped to raise the money by mining and
processing bauxite, including from a sensitive reserve, the Atewa
forest. Environmentalists sued to block mining in the forest. A
plan to build a bauxite refinery may not prove feasible. If the gov
ernment cannot show how it will repay Sinohydro, it is not clear
how much of the $2bn will materialise. Four years on just one pro
ject, a road interchange, has been completed.
Perhaps China will find another way to help Ghana as it faces
deep fiscal woes. But this is a reminder of its leverage over African
countries, which is well understood by their politicalleaders. If
China can help them win elections in Africa bybuilding roads, it
can also cost them elections by not building them.n
China has
promised aid
or financing
in return for
support at the unThe mediaChina, meet Fourth Estate
T
hecallcame from the Chinese embassy. During a video meet
ing in March Joe Biden had warned Xi Jinping of “consequenc
es” if China provided material support to Russia in its invasion of
Ukraine. But China wanted readers in Africa to get their version.
Xinhua, the official news service, supplies content free to many
African media outlets. It made sure the story was available in time
for Tanzanian deadlines. A Chinese diplomat alerted news outlets
to the case, according to one journalist. The diplomat said the sto
ry was “important” to them.
At least one newspaper, theCitizen, used Xinhua’s story. Read
ers did not see any hint of a warning from Mr Biden. Instead they
read Mr Xi’s admonition that natoshould talk to Russia to meet
“the security concerns” of Russia and Ukraine. (They also learned
that “China stands for peace and opposes war”.) America’s mes
sage was presented as deferential by comparison. Xinhua said Mr
Biden wanted a “candid dialogue and closer cooperation”. The ac
count devoted much space to promoting China’s line on Taiwan,
twice mentioning Mr Biden’s assurance that America does not
support its independence.
Propaganda is promoted online as well. A handful of Tanza
nian influencers with modest socialmedia followings are paid
50,000 to 100,000 Tanzanian shillings (about $2244) a month to
retweet and like the embassy’s posts on Twitter and Facebook,
says Khalifa Said, editor of The Chanzo news site.The embassy
pays to place opeds in newspapers by the ambassador or by Afri
can academics promoting China’s line. And diplomats try to sup
press negative stories, from African news about Chinese nationals
arrested for poaching to Western stories about the oppression of
Uyghurs in Xinjiang. They may be unable to kill a story altogether,
but they discourage followups. “Sometimes they succeed, some
times they don’t,” says one Tanzanian journalist.
Chinese officials are working more aggressively to shape Afri
can opinions of their regime and even the infrastructure of Afri
can media. The most visible push has been in content. Over the
past decade Mr Xi has urged state media and diplomats to “tell
China’s story well” abroad, declaring that the Communist Party
needed to improve its “discourse power”. China has hugely ex
panded its state media, adding local bureaus and staff at Xinhua,
China Radio International and cgtn, the official international tv
news service, which opened its African headquarters in Nairobi in2012. China Dailylaunched a weekly African edition in 2012. Last
year People’s Daily Online, the website of China’s official mouth
piece, started a Swahililanguage service.
More quietly China has cultivated relations to influence me
dia, from heads of state to editors to young journalists. Chinese
state media and diplomats have formal and informal partnerships
with media companies, becoming suppliers of free content to
most, reliable paying advertisers for many and even buying stakes
in some. Propaganda officials call placing their content in these
foreign outlets “borrowing the boats to reach the sea.” Sometimes
this happens without even hinting at China’s involvement.
Young and old African journalists are brought to China for
training in the state media’s nonconfrontational, more govern
mentfriendly approach to news. China brings officials from Afri
can countries to seminars on “cyberspace management”. At one
China works hard to shape public opinion, but its lasting
impact could be on the infrastructure of media