The Economist - UK (2022-05-28)

The Economist May 28th 2022 SpecialreportChinainAfrica 11

Defenceco-operation

Ace of bases

I

n march,nearlyfiveyearsafteritopened,China’smilitary

baseatDjiboutihaditsfirstportcall,theLuomahu, a supplyship.

Therewasnopompandcircumstanceaboutit.Butthestructureit

dockedatisofmoreconsequence.Jutting1,100feet(335m)intothe

GulfofAdenisa pierlargeenough,sayAmericananalysts,totake

aircraft­carriers,amphibiousassaultshipsornuclearsubmarine­

s.AndinTanzaniaChinaisalsopushingtorevivea $10bndeepwa­

terportthatcouldtakemuchthesamehardware.

TheAmericansthinkChinawantstoextendthereachofits

armedforcesallroundtheIndianOcean.EquatorialGuineaisin

talksovera Chinesemilitarybase,theysay.ThatwouldgiveChi­

na’snavya footholdontheAtlanticcoast.TheChinesearealsoex­

ploringotheroptions.“TheyhaveplacedbetsfromMauritaniain

thenorthtoNamibiainthesouthandinmanycountriesin­be­

tween,”GeneralStephenTownsend,headofAfricaCommandfor

theAmericanarmy,toldsenatorsinApril.

Chinaclearlywantstobea globalpower.Sinceopeningitsbase

inDjibouti,ostensiblytosupportanti­piracyefforts,Chinahas

steppedupitsmilitaryengagementinAfrica.In 2018 itsdefence

ministryhostedaChina­Africadefenceandsecurityforumin

Beijing.Almost 50 Africancountriesattended,leavingwithpublic

commitmentstoincreaseco­operation.InthesameyeartheChi­

neseconductedexercisesinCameroon,Gabon,GhanaandNige­

ria.Andin 2019 theyconducteda jointexercisewithTanzaniaand

a trilateralnavalexercisewithSouthAfricaandRussia.

TheChinesearebigarmssuppliers,sellingto 21 sub­Saharan

armiesbetween 2016 and2020,morethandidanyothernational

supplier,saystheStockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInsti­

tute.Salesincludeanti­tankmissilestoRwandaandarmoured

personnelcarrierstoNigeria.Chinesemilitarykitaccountedfor

20%ofsub­SaharanAfrica’sarmsimportsbyvalue,behindonly

Russia(30%),whichsellsbigger­ticketstufftoa shorterlistof

buyers.America’ssharewasonly5%.Chinaalsodonatesolder

hardwareasa sweetener.Ithasbuiltmilitarytrainingfacilities

andbarracksinTanzaniaandEquatorialGuinea.

ChinaisreadywhenAmericamightbereluctant.“IhadanAfri­

canleadertellmeadrowningmanwill

reach for anyhand,” General Townsend

toldsenators.“Manyhavechallengeswith

violentextremistorganisationsandthey

needtosecuretheircountry.Sotheywill

reachtoanyoffer.Frequentlythoseoffers

arefastestfromChinaandRussia.”Amer­

ica’shelp,GeneralTownsendsays,often

comeswith“strings”attached,suchasup­

holdingdemocraticvalues.Butdemocra­

ciesgethelpfromChina,too.OneAmeri­

canofficialtriedtodiscouragea WestAfri­

canleaderfromlettingChinabuilda train­

ingfacility. “Iknow,”theleaderreplied,

“butI needthatfacility.”Americanofficials

findthenumberofChinesemilitaryatta­

chésinAfricahasgrownfast.

Theimpactofallthismilitaryactivityis

unclear.Chinaisnothinglikethedestabi­

lisingforcethatRussiahasbeen.Itparticipatesinunpeacekeep­

ingmissions,andhasnorogueprivatearmytomatchRussia’s

WagnerGroup.ChinawantsexperienceforitstroopsinAfrica,but

alsotheimageofreliabilityasa partner.Witheconomicinterests

ineveryAfricancountry,Chinaseeksstability,notchaos.

ChinabeganexpandingitsroleforthesamereasonthatAmer­

icaandBritainoncedid:toprotecteconomicinterests,peopleand

companies.Theneedforoverseasexpansionwasobviousin2011,

whenthenavyhelpedevacuateover30,000Chinesecitizensfrom

Libya.AndinMarchthisyearal­ShababterroristsinKenyashot

fivepeopledeadandabductedtwoChineseforemen,chopping

bothhandsoffonebeforetheywerereleased.

YetChina’sarmyisnottheretofightal­Shabab.“They’renot

puttingskininthegameinSomalia,”saysWilliamZana,whowas

untilrecentlycommanding generalofAmerican forcesinthe

HornofAfrica.“They’reintheplaceswherewhatthey’redoingin

securityispurelytofeedtheirbusinessinterests.”Partlythatisbe­

causesomeAfricanpartners,includingKenya,prefertoworkwith

Americantroops,whohaveexpertiseinbattlingJihadists.But

China’swillingnesstoworkwithout“strings”alsodrawsitnatu­

rallytoauthoritarian statesassecuritypartners.Itsambitions

maymerelystrengthenabysmalautocrats.

Ethiopia’swarwithTigrayanrebelsoffersanexample.A former

Americanofficialtalkedofmeetinga Chineseenvoyearlyinthe

conflictandfindingtheirinterestsoverlapped.“Chinawasdeeply

worriedaboutthedeteriorationoftheintegrityofthestate,as

werewe,”hesaid.Butinsteadofcallingforpeacetalks,Chinaap­

parentlyhelpedarmtheregimeofAbiyAhmedwithdrones. “So

theirsolutionwasprobablydifferentfromoursolution.”

Apoliceman’slot

IftheChinesearmywantedtoconveytheimageofa selflesspo­

liceman,itdidnotgetthebeststartinDjibouti.Theoriginalpre­

textforitsbasewastosupportanti­piracymissionsintheGulfof

Aden.Americahasa baselessthantenmilesawayinCampLem­

onnier,establishedaftertheSeptember11thattacksona former

garrisonoftheFrenchforeignlegion.ItistheonlyAmericanbase

inAfrica.France,ItalyandJapanalsohavebasesinDjibouti. But

theChinesemilitarypresencehasnotmeshedwellwithothers.In

2018 AmericanofficialsaccusedChinaoftargetingmilitaryplanes

withlasers,causingminoreyeinjuriestopilots.Chinahasnow

puta stoptothatbehaviour,whichprobablyannoyedtheirhosts

inDjiboutiasmuchastheAmericans.ButAmerican officials

thinkChina’spresenceatDjiboutiislessaboutpiracyandmore

aboutlearninghowtooperateanoverseasbaseandprojectpower.

Morebasesseemsuretocome.HuBoofPekingUniversity

wantstoseethearmy“steppingout”to

“distributepowerona globalscale”.Other

Chineseanalystsopenlyadvocatea more

aggressive“exterior”strategyofpushing

intowatersfarfromhome.Oneaim,writes

RyanMartinsonoftheusNavalWarCol­

legeinNewport,RhodeIsland,istodivert

AmericanattentionfromChinesewaters.

Africaisa primehuntinggroundforbases.

Chinaisinvolvedinfinancing,buildingor

operating 61 portsin 30 Africancountries,

writesIsaacKardon,alsooftheusNaval

WarCollege.Chinesewarshipshavevisited

someofthem.Americanofficialsareseek­

ingtodissuadehostsfromallowingmuch

morethanportcalls.

MostAfricancountriesarenotkeento

alienate theworld’sbiggestsuperpower.

ThepresidentofTanzania,SamiaSuluhu

China is on a path to becoming a global militarypower;

that path goes through Africa

Arms to oblivion

Arms exports to sub-Saharan Africa

Trend indicator value*, m

Source: SIPRI

*Measures value of arms transfers, adjusted

for capability rather than financial value

600

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