52 The Economist May 28th 2022
China
Rumoursandleadershipstruggles
How to see Xi
A
mid theirfrantic efforts to halt the
spread of covid19 and revive a sputter
ing economy, officials around China have
also had to attend some routine meetings.
They involve lectures on the need for abso
lute loyalty to the country’s leader, Xi Jin
ping. “Turn your hearts to the general sec
retary”, rural bureaucrats were instructed
at one such gathering this month in south
western China. Later this year Mr Xi is ex
pected to be anointed for another five years
as Communist Party chief. The strong un
spoken message of these meetings is that
no one else can do the job.
Few analysts doubt that Mr Xi will begin
an unprecedented third term after the par
ty’s 20th congress, which will probably be
held in the autumn. But it is safe to assume
that his “zerocovid” policy, which this
year has resulted in widespread lockdowns
and swingeing damage to the economy, is
causing political stress. Even on China’s
censored social media, it is clear that pub
lic anxiety about the government’s han
dling of the pandemic is growing.
Such a climate naturally breeds specu
lation about disharmony within the lead
ership. In recent days rumours have
spread—not least through Chineselang
uage media abroad—of divisions in the
party and highlevel opposition to Mr Xi’s
career plans. Though flimsily sourced,
they deserve attention—not as indicators
of any real impediment to Mr Xi’s extended
rule (the loyalty meetings strongly suggest
he is well on track for that), but as remind
ers of how handicapped outsiders are in
their study of China’s ruling elite.
Analysis is not made easier by wishful
thinking. There are probably many in the
party and business elite who would like to
see the back of Mr Xi. His anticorruption
campaign has targeted some 4m officials,
including about 400 at or above the rank of
deputy minister. Many intellectuals resent
Mr Xi for tightening ideological controls
and for his ruthless crushing of dissent.
Among ordinary Chinese Mr Xi is widely
admired as a strongman who has boosted
China’s global clout. Many also remain
convinced that the West's handling of co
vid is a deathstalked disaster. Still, Mr Xi's
pandemic controls are brutal for a growing
list of cities and business sectors.
In such an oppressive political environ
ment, any leader who appears less harsh
than Mr Xi attracts attention. The party’s
secondhighestranking member, Li Ke
qiang, the prime minister, is one such—an
economic reformer who, unlike Mr Xi, ap
pears at home with Westerners (and speaks
good English). A few years before Mr Xi
took over as ruler in 2012 there was specu
lation that Mr Li was in the running for the
job. Those who crave a return to warmer re
lations between China and the West, and
less of a role for the party in China’s econ
omy, are naturally disposed to seize on
signs that Mr Li—a distant number two to
Mr Xi—is gaining political ground.
Much of the recent rumour has focused
on Mr Li’s visibility in state media, his
warm words to businesspeople (who have
been quivering, following a crackdown on
China’s tech giants) and his forthright re
marks on China’s economy. On May 25th
Mr Li said China’s economic difficulties
were greater “in some aspects” than the
initial impact of the pandemic in 2020.
Could this signal a shift, some wonder,
away from Mr Xi’s ideologically driven
campaigns that have spooked investors?
Reading the runes in a year of political tension for China and its ruler
→Alsointhissection
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54 Crookedbankers
55 Chaguan: A generational divide