eaders 9L
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ver thepast 20 yearsChinahasbeenthebiggestandmost
reliable source of growth in the world economy. It contrib
uted a quarter of the rise in global gdpover that period and ex
panded in 79 of 80 quarters. For most of the period since China
opened up after Mao’s death, the Communist Party has taken a
practical approach to making the country richer, mixing market
reforms with state control. Now, however, China’s economy is in
danger. The immediate issue is its zerocovid campaign, which
has caused a slump and may condemn the economy to a stop
start pattern. That is compounding a bigger problem: President
Xi Jinping’s ideological struggle to remake state capitalism (see
Briefing). If it stays on this path China will grow more slowly and
be less predictable, with big consequences for it and the world.
After nearly two months the lockdown of Shanghai is easing,
but China is far from being covidfree, with fresh outbreaks in
Beijing and Tianjin. More than 200m people have been living
under restrictions and the economy is reeling. Retail sales in
April were 11% lower than a year earlier and purchases of kfc,
cars and Cartier are weak. Although some workers are living on
factory floors, industrial output and export volumes have
dipped. For the full year China may struggle to grow much faster
than America for the first time since 1990, in the aftermath of the
massacre near Tiananmen Square. For Mr Xi the timing is awful:
after the 20th party congress later this year, he
intends to be confirmed for a third term as pres
ident, breaking the recent norm that leaders
bow out after two.
It is, however, Mr Xi who bears much re
sponsibility for the twin blows to the economy.
The first is his zerocovid policy, which has
been enforced for 28 months. The party fears
that opening up would lead to an exit wave that
could kill millions. That may be true, but it has wasted precious
time: 100m people over 60 are not triplejabbed. It refuses to im
port more effective Western mrnavaccines. Instead the plan
may be to push zerocovid into next year. China has backed out
of hosting the Asian Cup, a football contest, in June 2023. There
is talk of permanent testing stations and a standing army to
swab nostrils for ever. Since Omicron is highly transmissible,
more outbreaks and lockdowns are inevitable. But since the ze
rocovid policy is identified with Mr Xi, any criticism of it is
viewed as sabotage.
That same ideological zeal is behind the second shock, a se
ries of economic initiatives that form what Mr Xi calls his “new
development concept”, which is meant to address “great chang
es unseen in a century”, such as the SinoAmerican split. The
goals are rational: to tackle inequality, monopolies and debt,
and to ensure that China dominates new technologies and is for
tified against Western sanctions. Yet in all cases Mr Xi believes
the party must take the lead, and implementation has been pun
itive and erratic. A blizzard of fines, new regulations and purges
has caused the dynamic tech industry, which contributes 8% of
gdp, to stagnate. And a savage but incomplete crackdown on the
property sector, responsible for over a fifth of gdp, has led to a
funding crunch—one reason why housing sales fell by 47% in
Aprilcomparedwitha yearearlier.
The government hopes a vast stimulus programme that is in
the works will help it meet the official growth target of 5.5% for
2022 and calm nerves ahead of the congress. On May 19th Li Ke
qiang, the prime minister, urged officials to “act decisively” to
restore growth, and the central bank cut mortgage rates. The par
ty has tried to reassure terrified tech tycoons. A likely next step is
a big bondfinanced government infrastructure programme.
But more piles of debt and acres of concrete won’t obviate the
need for draconian lockdowns or reduce the risks from Mr Xi’s
economic model. It involves expanding the scope of the least
productive part of the economy: the governmentrun one. Chi
na’s industrial policy has had formidable successes, for example
building a dominant global position in advanced batteries. Mr Xi
hopes that technology and a new cohort of state investment
funds will make decisionmaking more agile. But don’t forget all
the dismal failures, from rustbelt industries to microchips.
Meanwhile the incentives in the most productive part of the
economy, the private sector, have been damaged (see Finance &
economics section). You can see that in the financial markets,
which have seen large outflows. The cost of capital has risen:
Chinese shares trade at a 45% discount to American ones, a near
record gap. The calculations of investors and entrepreneurs are
changing. Some fear that the financial upside
for any business will be capped by a party that is
suspicious of private wealth and power. Ven
ture capitalists say they have switched to bet
ting on the biggest subsidies, not the best ideas.
For the first time in 40 years no major sector of
the economy is undergoing liberalising re
forms. Without them, growth will suffer.
Mr Xi’s ideological economy has big implica
tions for the world. Though stimulus could gin up demand,
more lockdowns are likely, imperilling a global economy flirting
with recession. In business, China’s size and sophistication
make it impossible for multinationals to ignore. But more will
rebalance supply chains away from China, as Apple is reportedly
doing. Chinese champions may dominate some industries of
the 2030s, but the West is likely to become a warier importer of
Chinese products. In diplomacy, a less ambitious and indepen
dent private sector means China’s presence abroad will be more
stateled and political. It may become more malign, but also less
effective, as our special report on China and Africa explains.
The perils of one-man rule
And what of life inside a more insular China? While people vent
online about lockdowns and lost jobs, this is unlikely to trans
late into unrest thanks to surveillance, propaganda and broad
support for the party’s goals. Some technocrats disagree with the
country’s leftward shift but lack the power and courage required
to object to it. And to the extent it can be discerned from the
black box of elite politics, there is no rival to Mr Xi, who is 68 (see
China section). Yet in the runup to a party congress that may see
him secure power until at least 2027, the shortcomings ofone
man rule in the world’s secondlargest economy are glaring.n
How Xi Jinping is damaging China’s economy
Ideology versus prosperity