16 THE AVIATION HISTORIAN Issue No 21
on the Lightning and, after trying overwing,
wingtip, ventral semi-recessed and underwing
carriage, found that the same crate used for
the Firestreak was best. The P.23 benefited
from work done for the P.22, as the earlier
study had concluded that there was no point
in the Lightning carrying two Genies, because
the target might not merit, or the interception
“solution” be safe enough, to use a nuclear
warhead. Therefore, a secondary armament
should be used, and, since the Lightning F.
and the P.22 lacked internal guns, some other
weapon should be carried.
This was the Microcell 2in (5cm)-diameter
unguided rocket. The standard rocket pod
held 37 rockets, so the Lightning could carry a
Genie on the port pylon and a rocket pod on the
starboard. Of course, the rockets were a collision-
course weapon, aimed with a gunsight, if such
equipment was fitted. The P.22 could carry much
more, up to ten pods, but could carry a mixed
load of two Genies and two pods or two Red Tops
and two pods. Thanks to the launch rails being
on a trapeze, the rockets on the forward stores
stations could be fired without affecting those on
the aft. This was particularly important with the
Genie, as the efflux from its Thiokol SR49-TC-
rocket motor was highly corrosive.
A DIFFERENT KIND OF INTERCEPTOR
The P.22, with its varied weapons load and
long-range radar, differed substantially from the
established thinking on interceptors — i.e. early
warning, scramble, climb, destroy the target and
return to base — of which the Lightning and the
designs to OR.329/F.155 were prime examples.
The P.22 was aimed at a different mission profile,
with the aircraft patrolling out towards any
incoming enemy aircraft. The P.17A’s capacious
internal tankage gave the P.22 a 5hr endurance
on a patrol line that was far enough away to
destroy the bombers before stand-off missiles
were launched. This might be the reason the
P.22 was effectively hidden — it conflicted with
the Stage 1¾ and Stage 2 SAGWs intended to
destroy bombers at ranges of up to 200 miles
(320km), which was 100 miles (160km) less than
the maximum detection range of the ground-
based radars. Of course, if the ground radars
were being jammed by Soviet electronic warfare
platforms, the S-band homer on the P.22 could be
critical to their continuing operation.
So, the P.22 would have possessed the
capability of using state-of-the-art weapons
systems and could have carried later radar-
guided weapons such as Radar Red Top and
the AIM-7 Sparrow III. These would require
cutting-edge radar systems and these were on
the drawing boards. How would the P.22 have
compared with the SAGWs being developed
for a post-Sandys air defence? The Bloodhound
Mk 1 to meet Stage 1 was in service in 1958
but, with a range of only 25 miles (40km), was
useful only as a defence for the V-bomber bases
against aircraft carrying freefall bombs; but it
did give the RAF experience of operating guided
weapons. The real area air-defence systems were
Blue Envoy to Stage 1¾ and the Stage 2 SAGWs.
Blue Envoy, with a range of 150 miles (240km),
continuous-wave guidance, mid-course update,
nuclear warhead and Mach 3 performance,
would have been a formidable weapon.
Stage 2 was just not feasible as it called
for a range of 200 miles (322km) which was
the maximum detection range of the UK’s
early-warning radars. When the scale of the
development programme was realised, the
USA’s Boeing IM-99 BOMARC was proposed,
but was met with scepticism as its pulsed-radar
guidance was deemed susceptible to jamming.
There was also the small matter of its 250-mile
(400km) range, which from bases in south-east
England would cover northern France. As one
senior member of the Air Staff stated, “We’re not
defending the bloody French!”
By 1964 the thinking behind Sandys’ Defence
White Paper was being reassessed. The world
had changed since 1957, with flexible response
replacing the tripwire nuclear strategy, and
Britain’s withdrawal from Empire bringing
about a more Europe/North Atlantic-focused
defence policy. Professor R.V. Jones, head of
the 1964 Working Party on Air Defence, had
investigated the air defence of Great Britain, and
the long-endurance interceptor plus Bloodhound
Mk 2 were to form the main air defence of the
UK. But it would be 20 years before the Warton
design team’s ideas saw the light of day with the
Tornado Air Defence Variant (ADV). Perhaps the
P.22 had been too well hidden.
The P.22 was hidden away for half a century,
one of those “under the counter” programmes
undertaken in the design offices of Britain’s
aviation companies. Perhaps, had the P.22 been
shown to Sandys, its capability of operating at
long-range and for long periods might have
appealed to his way of thinking. The P.
would certainly have found approval with the
Jones Committee that ultimately led to the
Tornado ADV.COMING SOON Using declassified official
brochures, Tony Buttler investigates “Hawker’s
TSR.2” — the P.1129, designed to OR.339.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author would like to thank
Damien Burke, Terry Panopalis and Tony Wilson for their
invaluable help during the preparation of this article.TAH