36 THE AVIATION HISTORIAN Issue No 21bearing as measured relative to true or magnetic
north — Ed.]
Middle East HQ considered that it would be
safe to fly at 20,000ft (6,100m) and sent a signal
regarding the security of the proposed route
to the Air Ministry in the UK on February 7;
BOAC Cairo was advised that the Air Ministry
concurred. Consequently, on the 8th, HQ ME
sent signal A.546 to BOAC Bristol, raising the
question of enemy interception and ground
hazards as follows:
“In view very small margin of endurance of
Liberator AM918 [sic] on flight Egypt—United
Kingdom and continued unfavourable weather,
propose following alteration in route return
flight Liberator G-AGDR to UK: [RAF El] Daba
to 34° 10’N, 22° 30’E; to 42°N, 18°E; to Hurn
all tracks rhumb line eight; not below 20,000ft
REPEAT 20,000ft; landfall English coast dawn;
Intelligence Air Ministry state[s] that risks of
interception by enemy air defence on route
are small; weather forecast for route is being
prepared in co-operation with Air Ministry
meteor[ologist]s; indications are that weather
is unlikely to be much worse than on original
route; possibility of slightly stronger headwinds
is counterbalanced by great decrease in distance;
request concurrence to proposal if new route
satisfactory; suggest consideration be given to its
permanent use or at least as alternative during
winter months. AM [Air Ministry] Whitehall,
please pass to 44 Group.”
The reply from No 44 Group (A.284) advised
against the proposed new route, but BOAC Cairo
was not satisfied that this had been cleared by
Bristol, so signalled back on February 9 (AZ500):“Is RAF signal A.284 of February 8 your
reply to HQ RAF Middle East [signal] A.546,
addressed to you care of Air Ministry [?]; if not
what is your reply [?]”
The situation was getting out of control. Bristol
replied with signal JP743 on the 11th:
“AZ500; on forecast for last night, route
described [in] RAF signal A.546 shows saving
in flight time 1hr 38min assuming TAS 200kt.
Do not consider this outweighs risk. Lisbon
impossible for Liberators until new aerodrome
[at] Portela available [in] near future.”
Without stating it in black and white, Bristol
was saying that the proposed direct route was
not satisfactory owing to the lack of an alternate
diversionary airfield and agreeing with No 44
Group, but the signal arrived in a mutilated
form which left the impression that Bristol
had no objection. Just to be sure, BOAC Cairo
checked back with Bristol (AZ519), but no reply
had been received by February 14, and the
aircraft departed at 1925hr GMT with a flight
plan indicating a flight time of 13hr 10min,
although Page was of the opinion that the actual
headwinds would be less than forecast.
Bristol’s reply to AZ519 (JP755) was received
at 2100hr GMT on the 14th, more than an hour
and a half after the aircraft’s departure, stating
clearly that the aircraft was NOT to fly the direct
route on this first return voyage and that the
proposal would be fully discussed with No 44
Group on completion of the flight. BOAC Cairo
took no action to recall the aircraft nor did it
advise that the aircraft had already departed on
the direct route. An estimated time of arrival
(ETA) for “Point H” was included, however,Although arguably far from the front line, flying with RAF Ferry Command
was by no means an easy option — some 44 Ferry Command crew
and passengers were killed in August 1941 alone, with a further ten
that September. Conditions aboard the organisation’s Liberators were
primitive, with the cold proving to be the greatest enemy.AUTHOR’S COLLECTION