The Aviation Historian — Issue 21 (October 2017)

Issue No 21 THE AVIATION HISTORIAN 61

I

N A CONFLICT in which close air combats

were relatively sporadic, the USAF’s

Operation Bolo is one of the better-known

examples of the Vietnam War, and is

celebrated in the USA as an object lesson in

tactical innovation, technological superiority and

leadership, rewarded with success. It was to be

a fragile success, however, for in the following

weeks the MiGs of the Khong Quan Nhan Dan Viet

Nam (Vietnam People’s Air Force — VPAF) made

an aggressive return to the fray, overcoming their

difficulties by devising new tactics. Bolo also

highlighted the difference between two opposing

conceptions of how to fight an air war.

The USA initially anticipated a swift conclusion

to the conflict by unleashing the entire might of

its air power against its third-world adversary.

America’s air arms quickly found this strategy

frustrated, however, and were forced by their

leadership into a gradual, cautious and costly

protracted campaign aimed at denying North

Vietnamese support to the communist insur-

gents in the south. The USA found itself on a

collision course with China as early as the start

of Operation Rolling Thunder, the air campaign

against North Vietnam, in March 1965. Beijing

sent several anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) divisions

to bolster the fledgling North Vietnamese air-

defence system, with Chinese troops donning

North Vietnamese military uniforms.

To their alarm, the Americans also found

themselves facing surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)

operated by Soviet technicians, as American

signals intelligence (SIGINT) intercepts would

reveal. All was in place for a replay of the Korean

conflict, in which the USA had not only faced the

Korean People’s Army Air Force, but also entire

Soviet and Chinese air divisions. Less than three

years after the Berlin and Cuban missile crises,

the probability of a global — and possibly nuclear

— conflict, at least with China, had to be taken

seriously by President Lyndon B. Johnson.

Guerrilla air warfare

It was within this context that North Vietnam

invested a substantial part of its economic and

military resources in setting up an integrated air-

defence system which, once completed, would

replace the Chinese units. The initial plan was

to cover main urban centres like Hanoi and

Haiphong, as well as some industrial sites such

as the Thai Nguyen steel mill and the coalmines

at Hong Gai and Cam Pha.

A second phase would see the system expanded

to cover the whole of North Vietnam, particularly

the vital logistic routes that channelled men and

equipment towards South Vietnam. With limited

resources, not least in educated and qualified

personnel, North Vietnam was forced to restrict

the development of the VPAF, instead devising

an original doctrine in which air power was seen

only as an adjunct to its ground-based air-defence

assets. Deploying only two fighter regiments

of MiG-17s (Nato reporting name Fresco) and

MiG-21s (Fishbed), a total of around 100 fighters,

the VPAF had no illusions about its ability to

secure air superiority against 1,500 American

combat aircraft. The main task of its interceptors

would be to harass and disperse American attack

formations, making the latter more vulnerable

to SAM and AAA units as part of a “guerrilla air

warfare” strategy. If, by making firing passes,

the VPAF’s fighters could succeed in forcing

the American fighter-bombers to release their

bombs before reaching their intended targets, the

mission could be deemed a success. The ability

of the VPAF’s inexperienced pilots to create such

a nuisance grew over the months, despite heavy

losses, forcing American pilots to recognise the

courage and determination of their opponents.

By the end of 1966 the American air campaign

was gaining momentum, but it seemed to have

no tangible effect on the Hanoi leadership and

its determination to continue the war. Receiving

foreign journalists, Chairman Ho Chi Minh

reaffirmed his determination to continue the

struggle for “ten, 20 or even 30 more years, for

OPPOSITE PAGE Colonel Robin Olds, CO of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing and mastermind behind Operation Bolo,

is lifted aloft by members of his unit on the occasion of the completion of his last combat mission over Vietnam in

September 1967. TOP A haggard President Johnson (left) confers with his team over a model of Khe San in 1968.