The Aviation Historian — Issue 21 (October 2017)

64 THE AVIATION HISTORIAN Issue No 21

be a poor dogfighter, owing to a restricted field

of vision for the pilot, especially to the rear and

below the nose. As a result, the MiG-21 pilots

were ordered to disengage as soon as they

found themselves in a disadvantageous position.

Several aircraft were lost after running out of

fuel while trying to outrun the American fighters

patrolling over their bases or along the Chinese

border, cutting off all potential escape routes.

An important issue for the VPAF was the close

co-ordination required between the Ground

Control Interception (GCI) officer and the

pilots who relied on him for target guidance, a

serious problem being the limited avionics of the

MiG-21. The MiG-21PF’s RP-21 Sapfir radar had

a practical detection range of only 4–8 miles

(7–13km), while the MiG-21F had only a radar

rangefinder, making both variants completely

dependent on ground control for target vectoring.

By comparison, the F-4C’s AN/APQ-100 radar

had a detection range of around 37 miles (60km).

The MiG-21’s weapons system was also very

limited, comprising two R-3S (Nato reporting

name AA-2 Atoll) infrared guided missiles

(the MiG-21F had an additional Nudelman-

Rikhter NR-30 30mm autocannon). A copy of the

AIM-9B Sidewinder that equipped the Phan-

toms, the R-3S suffered from the same weakness,

namely a narrow acquisition cone from the rear

of the target for its infrared homing system.

During one early engagement, a flight of MiG-21s

expended no fewer than six Atolls against a group

of USAF Republic F-105 Thunderchiefs without

scoring a single hit. The North Vietnamese tried

to alleviate the problem by deploying mixed

formations, the leading MiG-21 being armed with

two R-3S missiles while his wingman carried two

pods of R-5M air-to-air rockets. The latter’s task

was to finish off the target with a salvo of rockets,

but the results were mixed at best. Nevertheless,

the VPAF claimed at least three kills with the

unguided rockets, downing an F-105 on June 7,

1966, and two F-4s on September 9 the same year.

The MiG-21s became more aggressive during

the summer of 1966, claiming two F-105s in July

against two Fishbeds shot down by Phantoms. By

the autumn the VPAF had begun to launch co-

ordinated attacks with MiG-17s and MiG-21s,

maintaining combat air patrols (CAPs) along

the enemy’s main approach routes to the Hanoi

area. The incoming American fighter-bomber

formations were initially engaged by SAMs

before being disrupted and forced into low-level

dogfights with MiG-17s at low level. The MiG-21s

would then pounce on the rear of the American

formations, trying to pick off isolated flights or

aircraft by making supersonic passes and firing

their Atolls at a distance of 5,000–6,500ft (1,500–

2,000m). The MiG-21s would then dive to low

altitude, where the radars of the Phantoms could

not pick them up.

In December 1966 the MiG-21s began to expand

their operating zone beyond the Red River Delta

area in the heart of North Vietnam. They now

operated from four bases, the main base being

Noi Bai (Phuc Yen for the Americans), north-west

of Hanoi, with detachments at Gia Lam in the

suburbs of the North Vietnamese capital, Cat Bi

near Haiphong and Kep, north-east of the Red

River Delta.

Encounters with MiGs intensified considerably

in September 1966, some 37 combats taking

place, 25 of which were against F-105s. The

strength of the two VPAF fighter regiments was

ABOVE The McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II formed the backbone of the USAF’s fighter units at the beginning

of the Vietnam conflict. They were, however, also used in numbers for the ground-attack role in addition to the

Republic F-105s. This F-4D of the 435th TFS, 8th TFW, refuels before heading north on a bombing mission in 1968.

VERN BARTON VIA WARREN THOMPSON