Issue No 21 THE AVIATION HISTORIAN 67
ties among the Soviet and Chinese advisors on
the bases precluded this scheme. To the great
frustration of the American pilots, the Pentagon
chose not to react when a group of North Korean
pilots became involved, flying VPAF MiGs. The
US Government’s fear was that, once the VPAF
had been eliminated, China might send its air
force into North Vietnam as part of a new phase
of escalation. Indeed, a clause in the secret mili-
tary accord signed between Hanoi and Peking
in February 1964 had explicitly envisaged the
deployment of Chinese air units to North Vietnam
in the case of hostilities with the USA. However,
despite North Vietnam’s repeated requests, the
Chinese government deferred its obligation in a
gesture of appeasement.^1 The only way to destroy
the MiGs would be to entice them into combat.
The most recent reports indicated that the MiGs
prioritised the F-105s, which had become less
manœuvrable since being equipped with newly
deployed AN/ALQ-71 (QRC-160) ECM pods to
jam the radars of the SAMs. The “Thuds” were
forced to fly rigid four-aircraft formations to
maximise their electronic jamming capability,
substantially increasing their vulnerability. Olds
devised a plan to make his agile Phantoms look
like cumbersome bomb-laden F-105s, in order
to lure the MiG-21s into a dogfight. A similar
trick had been used on July 4, 1965, when four
F-4Cs enticed four MiG-17s to attack them, the
Phantoms shooting down two of the Frescos. Olds
envisioned a far more ambitious plan to catch as
many of the elusive MiG-21s as possible.
Olds gathered a small planning team around
his Operations Officer, Capt John B. Stone, inclu-
ding Maj James D. Covington, Capt Ralph
Wetterhahn and Lt Joe Hicks. It appeared
that the North Vietnamese GCI stations had
an advantage in being able to vector their
interceptors undetected at low level towards
the American formations, the interceptors then
popping up to make a surprise firing pass. At
this point, American radar stations in South
Vietnam, Thailand and aboard US Navy ships
did not have the required range to cover the stra-
tegic Red River Delta area. The USAF’s Lock-
heed EC-121D Warning Star early-warning
aircraft could not detect the MiGs below 10,000ft
(3,000m), and, when the latter were higher, the
EC-121Ds could not ascertain an exact altitude.Silver Dawn
Olds, however, learnt that the National Security
Agency (NSA) was eavesdropping on North
Vietnamese radio communications as part of the
top secret Project Silver Dawn, using speciallyFour pilots of the 923rd FR
walk along a line of the unit’s
MiG-17s before a mission in 1967. From left:
Luy Huy Chao (six kills), Le Hai (seven), Mai Duc Tai
(two) and Hoang Van Ky (five — KIA on June 5, 1967).MiG-21PF “4228” was one of the seven shot down during Operation Bolo, the pilot,
Vu Ngoc Dinh, ejecting safely. The aircraft is seen here with a typical armament load of
an R-3S (AA-2 Atoll) air-to-air missile on each wing and a 490lit (107 Imp gal) PTB-490
centreline fuel tank. Artwork by TOM COOPER © 2017
USAF