72 THE AVIATION HISTORIAN Issue No 21placing him at the top of the scroll of aces of the
Vietnam War.
Olds scored three more aerial victories as the
head of the 8th TFW. Reportedly, he passed up
several opportunities to achieve another kill to
become the first American ace of the conflict, not
wanting to be sent back to the USA before the
end of his tour of service in South-east Asia. After
his departure, Olds’s achievements in improving
air-combat training were not adopted by the
USAF, which preferred to focus on technology
developments, such as the introduction of the
AIM-4D Falcon air-to-air missile, which proved
to be a great disappointment. The NSA’s C-130B-
IIs were not used again in a tactical role despite
their clearly proven value. Their capabilities
were partly filled by a new electronic device, the
QRC-248 interrogator, installed on EC-121Ds
from October 1967, which enabled the Warning
Stars to read the MiGs’ IFF transponders,
detecting them even at low altitudes.
The MiG-21s returned to front-line operations in
April 1967 with new tactics. After suffering heavy
losses, particularly in May, the North Vietnamese
once again overcame their difficulties. In this
ongoing duel, both sides constantly refined and
adapted their tactics to each new development.
The previously unassailable superiority of the
Phantom was increasingly in jeopardy. The North
Vietnamese fighter force regained the initiative
at the end of the Rolling Thunder campaign,
inflicting serious losses on attacking enemy air-
craft, claiming 22 per cent of the total of thoseshot down, anti-aircraft artillery accounting for
most of the rest. The wheel had turned and the
ratio of kills to losses, at one point three to one
in favour of the Americans, had declined to a
mere 0·85 to one. By January 1968 the ratio had
shifted to five to one in favour of the MiG-21s.
It took the Americans several more years to deal
with this threat by improving technologically,
and tactically by devising a new air-combat
training programme.1 The secret military accord signed between North
Vietnam and China in February 1964 envisaged
the deployment of the People’s Liberation Army Air
Force in case of American air attacks undertaken
against the North. Hanoi was bitterly disappointed
when Beijing did not fulfil its promise. However, the
VPAF’s MiGs could seek asylum on Chinese air
bases across the border.
2 Bolo — a traditional large knife, like a dagger,
carried by Philippine warriors.
3 Pilots involved were Bui Duc Nhu, Nguyen Danh
Kinh, Nguyen Duc Thuan, Nguyen Van Coc and Vu
Ngoc Dinh.
4 By monitoring the radio frequencies used by the
VPAF, the 22 linguists aboard the two C-130B-IIs
recorded conversations of the following cumulative
lengths during Operation Bolo: 27hr in Vietnamese;
10hr in Korean; 3hr 10min in Chinese; 20min in
Russian. These totals comprise the initial phase
before the arrival of the American aircraft, the
actual combat and its immediate aftermath. The
implication of the North Korean is obvious.endnote references
ABOVE In the wake of the Operation Bolo setback, the VPAF grounded its MiG-21s for several weeks before
returning to combat with revised tactics, which inflicted heavy losses on the Americans in the last days of the
Rolling Thunder campaign, which ended in 1968. Here VPAF ace Nguyen Nhat Chieu (far left) relives a combat.TAHALBERT GRANDOLINI COLLECTION