The Aviation Historian — Issue 21 (October 2017)

(Jacob Rumans) #1
Issue No 21 THE AVIATION HISTORIAN 97

I


N THE LATE 1960s Charles W. Cain, founder
of Air-Britain, telephoned me to ask if I had
a letter from Lockheed’s Clarence “Kelly”
Johnson, in which the latter admitted that
he had incorporated some of the ideas put
forward for the Fairey FC.1 airliner in the design
of the American company’s L-049 Constellation.
Charles said that he had such a letter but could
not place it and wondered whether he had sent it
on to me, as the organisation’s Fairey specialist.
Unfortunately I did not see such a letter. But there
is certainly a distinct similarity between the two
types, work on the FC.1 commencing in 1938 and
Constellation design starting the following year. I
subsequently wrote to Johnson, who replied that
he had not incorporated any ideas from the FC.1
— well, he would say that, wouldn’t he?
So let the saga begin...

the cadman report
In November 1937 a committee was established
in the UK under the chairmanship of Lord
John Cadman to examine the state of British
civil aviation, as well as investigate charges of
inefficiency at the Air Ministry and staff issues
within Imperial Airways. The findings of the
committee’s report urged the use of government
funding for the development and production of
internationally competitive commercial aircraft.
The report, issued on March 8, 1938, was prefaced
by 13 pages of introductory “observations” by
the government, one of which pointed out that
British constructors with lucrative military orders
and those about to be awarded contracts under
contemporary expansion schemes had shown
little disposition to embark on costly ventures
to produce civil aircraft, which would probably
have to be terminated when war broke out. This
stemmed from concerns voiced by the Directorate
of Civil Aviation and the Air Ministry about how
Britain was lagging behind in the development
of civil landplanes. To remedy this, the report
suggested, the Air Ministry should get together
with commercial aircraft manufacturers and
operators to specify a set of requirements and
ask for design proposals, from which the most
promising would be picked for production.
The report also recommended that civil aviation
should receive increased government support
and funding, suggesting that it was a lack of
finance that was holding back Britain’s ability to
develop competitive modern airliners. It went
on to state that the government could be more
helpful to civil aviation and that a specialised
department should be established with its own

under-secretary. Imperial Airways, the report
continued, should concentrate on the Empire
routes, while British Airways Ltd, using British
aircraft, should fly to the principal European
cities. Furthermore, British Airways should
immediately seek government subsidies for the
establishment of routes to the Caribbean, Pacific
and South America. There was also a need for
greater co-operation between civil and military
aviation and for more research to be undertaken.
Taking heed of the report, the government set
up the Directorate of Civil Research & Production
(DCRP), which secured funding for two new
airliners; the Short S.32 and Fairey FC.1. The
former was already being worked on in response
to an Air Ministry specification which called for a
long-range monoplane to replace the Armstrong
Whitworth Ensign, already proving unsuitable
for the task for which it was intended. Trials of
both aircraft would lead to a decision as to which
would be selected for Imperial Airways.
In the wake of the Cadman report, and with
unusual promptitude, outline Specification 15/38
was issued for a “10–30-seater Civil Airliner” and
despatched to Armstrong Whitworth, Bristol,
Fairey, General Aircraft Ltd (GAL) and Vickers
on May 17, 1938. A covering letter explained
that financial assistance was available, including
contributions for prototype development and
production tooling. It also asked for prospective
rates of production, delivery dates and the
degree of financial help likely to be required. One
important proviso was that related effort must
not interfere with urgent work on military types.
Tenders were required within seven weeks.
Vickers was quick to decline the invitation,
followed in July by Armstrong Whitworth.
Bristol, Fairey and GAL accepted, as did Folland,
which had also been invited to tender later. In
July Specification 14/38 was issued for a long-
haul aircraft suitable for transatlantic operations,
which would become the Short Bros aircraft.
Specification 15/38 called for “a four-engined
all-metal monoplane civil airliner” with a
gross weight of around 42,000lb (19,000kg) and
structural provision for pressurisation — radical
thinking indeed for the day. The aircraft was to be
capable of clearing a 66ft (20m) screen in 1,000yd
after engine failure and to operate over a still-air
range of 1,000 miles (1,610km) on three engines
delivering 70 per cent of their rated power. Stalling
speed at maximum landing weight was to be no
greater than 68 m.p.h. (109km/h). An automatic
pilot was to be fitted, as was an anti-icing system.
The aircraft’s landing approach characteristics

OPPOSITE PAGE A scale model of the Fairey FC.1 is held aloft by John W.R. Taylor, who worked for the company
in his early years before going on to become one of the UK’s most distinguished aviation authors. Of ultra-modern
design, the FC.1 is seen here without the central fin added at a later stage.ALL IMAGES VIA AUTHOR UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED
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