AIR TRANSPORT
flightglobal.com 10-16 April 2018 | Flight International | 13ARJ21 testing
a breeze
Air Transport Pkiy in eastern Ukraine, and de-
stroyed the 777.
While no Buk missile can be de-
tected on the Russian radar images- a fact pointed out by the Russian
government, which has put for-
ward alternative theories on the
loss of MH17 – the analysis identi-
fied several reasons for its absence.
The Buk missile is capable of
speeds in excess of 1,400kt
(2,600km/h), and this supersonic
velocity is far beyond those typi-
cally being processed by civil
aviation surveillance systems.
“Display filters could limit the
visibility – this is to avoid clutter
on the radar image,” the analysis
adds. “The consequence is that,
therefore, a Buk cannot be seen.”
Russian authorities supplied
radar data in its original format, as
well as data converted to the
standard “Asterix” format. Inves-
tigators believe there is “no reason
to assume” that conversion result-ed in the loss of any relevant infor-
mation, but the analysis neverthe-
less covered both data sets.
“The findings by these radar
experts show that a Buk missile
could have been fired from the
firing location established by the
joint investigation team without
it being visible on the radar imag-
es,” the analysis states.
Investigators had sought data
from a second radar station, sited
at Baturinskaya, but none has
been supplied by Russia.
Dutch investigators are to ex-
amine the extent to which recom-
mendations regarding overflight
of conflict zones have been imple-
mented since the loss of MH17.
The Dutch Safety Board says it
wants to compile an inventory of
measures taken regarding air-
space management and sharing
of threat information.
It also intends to examine air-
lines’ risk-assessment strategies –
and accountability – when consid-
ering overflying conflict zones. ■The 777-200ER was brought down by a Buk surface-to-air weaponREX/ShutterstockINVESTIGATION DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW LONDONMH17 missile could have evaded radar
Display filters possibly limited visibility, says independent assessment on Russian data, as analysis considers theoriesREGULATION DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW LONDONEASA bids to reinforce flight recorder resilience
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nternational investigators have
confirmed that a surface-to-air
missile fired at a Malaysia Air-
lines Boeing 777-200ER could
have avoided detection on radar.
Such a weapon could have
simply been travelling too fast for
the surveillance processing capa-
bilities of the civil radar station at
Ust-Donetsk, the analysis indi-
cates. Ust-Donetsk is located in
the Rostov region of Russia.
The joint investigation team
looking into the destruction of
flight MH17 in July 2014 had en-
listed two independent radar spe-
cialists to examine radar data
from the station supplied by Rus-
sian authorities.
No other aircraft were dis-
played on radar in the vicinity of
MH17 at the time of the event,
the analysis has found.
The five-nation investigation
team had previously concluded
that an Almaz-Antey 9M38 Buk
surface-to-air weapon had been
fired from a field near Pervomais-E
uropean safety regulators have
detailed certification propos-
als to improve the protection of
information from flight recorders.
The European Aviation Safety
Agency says premature depower-
ing of cockpit-voice recorders has
resulted in loss of information
which might have been captured
if an alternate power source had
been installed.
EASA adds that some investi-gations have found both the
cockpit-voice and flight-data re-
corders were fed from the same
electrical bus – rendering both
recorders inoperative in the
event of bus failure.
The revision also intends to re-
duce the possibility that impact
sensors – known as g-switches,
and designed to stop the record-
ing – might accidentally be acti-
vated by other events.“Several safety investigation
bodies have reported reliability
issues with negative acceleration
sensors,” says EASA.
“In several occurrences involv-
ing high levels of airframe vibra-
tions, some g-switches were trig-
gered prematurely during the
occurrence and, therefore, the re-
cording of voices or data stopped
before the end of the flight.”
EASA is proposing updatingcertification specifications to en-
sure that g-switches are “not used
as the sole means” to detect a
crash impact.
The recommendation involves
relying on the start-stop logic of
the recorder, instead of the use of
dedicated sensors.
EASA is also proposing provi-
sions to accommodate installa-
tion of combination recorders as
well as deployable recorders. ■