air is assured from the outset.
In essence, such aircraft
can provide broadly the same
capability as an advanced
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
like an MQ-9 Reaper, but without
the need for a sophisticated
support network. However, like
current UAVs they lack the speed
and survivability in a hostile
environment, and so are scenario-
limited. However, I do concede
that in the right scenario and for
many countries they are more
than capable of delivering a cost-
effective and credible capability
in order to meet their more
modest national defence needs.
But there are a number of
reasons why I believe that such
aircraft are a false economy for
fourth- and fifth-generation, mid-
sized air forces, who face far
more deadly threats; indeed, they
would be unwise to be seduced
by the apparent cost advantages
that such aircraft seem to offer.
Preparing for
tomorrow’s wars
The most important reason is
that no matter how relevant
such a capability might be to
the specific conflict you fight
today, air forces (like maritime
and land forces) should always
man, train and equip to meet
or deter the deadlier one they
might fight tomorrow – especially
if they are likely to be wars of
necessity (ie for national survival
or critical interest) rather than
those of choice. There may be an
argument to make an adjustment
for protracted campaigns, like
those fought in recent years, but
that would still require you to
effectively double your effort and
increase your costs to procure
and maintain a new fleet of light
aircraft while still maintaining
a high readiness capability on
your more advanced fleet.
As armed forces learn to their
cost, if you let a capability
atrophy over time through
deliberate or unintended neglect,
it takes much longer to recover
it than it took to lose it.
If you accept this first, and
fundamental, premise then it
should also be accepted that
modern advanced fighters are
at least as capable of meeting
a lesser, counter-insurgency-
type threat (dumbing down
is much easier than smarting
up), so there is no capability
gap. Indeed, when you are
fighting a counter-insurgency
air campaign in geographical
areas that cover hundreds of
thousands of square miles, the
additional speed of response of
an advanced combat aircraft not
only saves lives but is also more
efficient in terms of numbers of
aircraft deployed, as you cover a
greater area with less aircraft.
Some larger air forces may have
the luxury of the budget and
resources to buy specialist attack
aircraft for niche roles, but as the
A-10 debate has demonstrated in
the US, even the mighty US Air
Force has to make difficult choices
now. So, while lighter, cheaper
attack aircraft will continue to find
a market with smaller air forces
round the world, they are a false
economy for those who face
more perilous potential or real
threats. After all, nobody wants
to find themselves in a gunfight
armed with a knife.Above: Afghan munitions airmen prepare to load a 250lb Mk81 bomb on an
Afghan Air Force A-29 in Kabul, last September. A light attack aircraft like the
Super Tucano is a sensible choice for smaller air forces engaged exclusively in
counter-insurgency campaigns. USAF/Staff Sgt Alexander W Riedel88 // JUNE 2018 #363 http://www.airforcesmonthly.com
Column Commander’s Update Briefing
NEXT MONTH:
ISTAR.AFMAbove: An RAF Tornado GR4 from No II (Army Cooperation) Squadron returns to
Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan after a ground close air support (GCAS) mission
in aid of coalition troops in 2014. The author contends that a fast jet remains
the optimal ground attack tool for a mid-size air force. Crown Copyright Below:
The rapidly developing capability of armed UAVs presents another challenge
to the concept of manned light attack aircraft. This 62nd Expeditionary
Reconnaissance Squadron MQ-9 Reaper at Kandahar Airfield is armed with four
GBU-38 Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), a loadout that was introduced
to combat earlier this year. USAF/Tech Sgt Paul Labbe