Pilot – June 2018

pilotweb.aero | Pilot June 2018 | 95

seen in good time; four incidents
where lack of communications
between pilots, or a failure to
assimilate traffic information,
meant that the pilots flew
into conflict; four examples of
poor controllership decisions;
four incidents where pilots
were simply concerned by the
presence of other aircraft that
were subsequently assessed as
probably being within normal
safety standards, and three
involving late sightings by the
pilots involved.’
The Board’s ‘Airproxes of the
Month’ feature two incidents,
both involving a degree of
inaction when sighting, or
becoming aware of, another
aircraft. In the first a Piper
PA-28 had left Shoreham
heading north-west and was
caught up by an SR22 which had
also departed to the north-west
a few minutes later. The SR22’s
pilot received TCAS indications
then saw the PA-28 about 1.5nm
ahead as he overtook. Although
closer than desirable, he judged
he had enough separation to pass
above the other aircraft by about
100ft. However, the Airprox
Board thought this was too close
and it would have been better
for the SR22 to have maintained
greater lateral separation to the
right as he passed by.
In the second case an
AgustaWestland AW139
helicopter and Mudry CAP10
met head-on at Beachy Head.
‘This was slightly less clear-cut
than the first incident,’ notes
the Board. ‘The CAP10 pilot
had the sun behind him and
saw the AW139 early enough
to judge that there was enough
separation. The AW139 pilot,
meanwhile, was looking
into sun and received TCAS
indications on the CAP10 head-
on just below and focused his
lookout ahead, but only saw the
CAP10 at the last moment too
close for his comfort... It would
have been better for the AW139
pilot to have immediately
increased his height when
receiving TCAS indications of
the CAP10 ahead rather than
just focusing his lookout.
‘This incident also raised the
issue of the “right-hand-rule”
on line-features (in this case
the coast). Although now not
formally part of SERA, the right-

hand-rule is still recommended

by the CAA, and the Board

thought that the AW139 pilot

could usefully have anticipated

that other pilots might be using

the rule as they routed along the

coast in the other direction. Both

cases demonstrate that positive

action should be taken when

detecting an unfolding conflict,

and pilots shouldn’t assume that

others will be as comfortable

with the separation as they

might be. The other pilot might

not be aware of your aircraft

until the last moment (especially

when being overtaken) and so

the onus is on everyone to avoid

others by a margin of separation

that they themselves would wish

if the roles were reversed.’

Another incident considered

by the Board involved two Tiger

Moths returning to Cambridge

after a formation training flight.

They were in echelon right

formation when another aircraft,

unidentified but thought to have

been a Van’s RV-6 or RV-9, came

from behind and joined echelon

left “for several minutes” one of

the Tiger Moth pilots reported

to Cambridge ATC after landing.

He said that he had spotted the

other aircraft approximately

100ft to the left and rear of the

formation and attempted to

wave it away while easing out to

give the other Tiger Moth room

to manoeuvre. The other aircraft

then dived and broke away going

unsighted under the formation.

He assessed the risk of collision

as “high”. The other aircraft’s

pilot has not been traced.

The Airprox Board could not

establish from radar pictures

whether the light-aircraft

pilot had actually formated on

the Tiger Moths, but agreed

that its radar separation and

manoeuvring indicated that

it had certainly flown close

enough to cause the Tiger’s pilot

concern. ‘Without a report from

the other pilot it was difficult

to determine why he flew past

the Tiger Moth formation twice,

and whether he was visual with

them at all times (and therefore

presumably unlikely to place

himself at a collision risk),’ it

says ‘[but] notwithstanding

the inadvisability of doing so,

the Board therefore reluctantly

agreed that they had insufficient

information to assess the risk, and

determined that the event was

best described as risk Category D

(‘Risk not determined’)

Full details of these and other

incidents, including conflicts

with drones, can be found at:

airproxboard.org.uk

Ditching and Sea

Survival Seminar

The Royal National Lifeboat

Institute is hosting the General

Aviation Safety Committee’s

annual Ditching and Sea

Survival Seminar on 9 July

in the Harbour Suite of the

RNLI College at Poole, Dorset.

‘Ditching procedures will be

covered in some detail during

a morning briefing, and in

the afternoon there will be an

opportunity to use the College’s

Sea Survival Pool to use GA

survival equipment in realistic

conditions with expert trainers

to impart knowledge and keep

you safe,’ says the

RNLI. ‘The Sea

Survival Pool

is a world-class

training facility

with special effects

that provide an

unforgettable

training

experience. If

you wish to bring

your own survival

equipment –

lifejacket, life raft, survival suits,

spray hoods and the like – you

are most welcome to do so as

there is nothing like training

with the equipment that you

might one day have to use!’

Only eighteen places are

available so early booking

is essential. The seminar

costs £175 and includes all

equipment, refreshments and

lunch. To book visit: gasco.

org.uk/events/seminars/

ditching_and_sea_survival

or email penny.gould@gen-

av-safety.demon.co.uk or tel:

01634 200203. GASCo is also

looking at the possibility of

arranging an add-on day in the

Portsmouth area to include a

‘Dunker’ underwater escape

training session (‘a must for

helicopter pilots,’ it says) and a

visit to the Aeronautical Rescue

Coordination Centre at the

National Maritime Operations

Centre in Fareham, Hampshire.

Safety Matters

BRIEFS:Robinson rollover

After a satisfactory 55-minute training flight in a Robinson R22 Beta

that had incorporated numerous takeoffs and landings, the instructor

assessed that his 41-hour PPL(H) student pilot handled the helicopter

competently and was ready for his first solo. He reminded the student

that with no instructor occupying the left seat, the helicopter’s centre

of gravity would move right and aft, so the cyclic stick would have

to be positioned to the left and forward to compensate, and that

gentle control movements should be made during lift off. The student

adjusted the cyclic stick to what he thought was the correct position

and raised the collective, but was unable to prevent the helicopter

rolling quickly onto its right side and striking the ground. The

instructor reported that the pilot kept the helicopter straight through

correct use of the yaw pedals but did not apply sufficient left cyclic

control to compensate for the change of centre of gravity. The pilot,

who had been trapped in his seat with minor injuries to his hands, was

helped to escape by the instructor, who later attributed the accident

to dynamic rollover – a phenomenon the pilot had been briefed about

in the classroom and pre-flight. The AAIB has reported on four other

accidents in the last ten years that have involved dynamic rollover,

three of which occurred during a student pilot’s first or second solo

flight in an R22 Beta, while the fourth occurred to an R66 during a

student pilot’s first solo on type.