17s, MiG-19s and MiG-21s of the North
Vietnamese Air Force. From 1965 through
late 1968, when Operation ‘Rolling
Thunder’ came to an end, the Navy kill
ratio was down at just 3.7:1.
Operational doctrine was to blame —
experts had declared that dog ghting
was a thing of the past and that the
F-4’s missiles were the key to aerial
supremacy. Indeed, traditional air combat
maneuvering (ACM) had been all but
abandoned in favor of missile use at range.
In fact, dog ghting had been largely
forbidden to Navy eet units. However, in
Vietnam the MiGs were simply out ying
their American opponents.
In early 1968 CAPT Frank Ault was
tasked to study why Navy crews were
having such a tough time. Writing in
the spring 1989 issue of The Hook, Ault
said: ‘as for desired results, I was told
‘an increase of not less than three times
better than performance to date, and as
soon as possible’.’ Completed later that
year, the 480-page Air-to-Air Missile System
Capability Review, dubbed the Ault Report,
identi ed 242 problem areas, ranging
from inadequate training to poor missile
reliability and performance.
As part of the solution, Ault
recommended establishing aA TOPGUN
instructor
prepares for
engine start
in an F-16A on
the ight line
at Fallon.US NAVY & MARINE CORPS AIR POWER YEARBOOK 2018
(^22) UNIT REPORT
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