Aeroplane – June 2018

22 http://www.aeroplanemonthly.com AEROPLANE JULY 2018

Skywriters

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‘Ardent’:

a view

from inside

I found the article

on Exercise

‘Ardent’ (Aeroplane

June 2018) most

interesting because

this is the fi rst time I have

read an independent, overall

appreciation of the exercise. At

the time I was a newly arrived

(and as yet unqualifi ed) fi ghter

controller at Neatishead GCI,

which also housed Eastern

Sector HQ. However, as

controllers we were at the

bottom end of the control and

reporting system, consequently

being deeply involved in tiny

parts of the exercise but not

needing to know the higher

ramifi cations.

We were acutely aware of

the danger of the defence

system being swamped by

mass raids on a broad front,

particularly at night. We had

three regular control cabins

(plus two extra ones with

this is the fi rst time I have

LETTER

of the

MONTH

limited facilities) which

would each house one

channel of control

— one controller per

cabin. Similar facilities

existed at the sector’s

inland GCI at Langtoft.

Theoretically each cabin

could be handling a squadron,

or exceptionally even a wing,

of fi ghters against day raids,

but at night it was very

different. Then it was a case of

one controller working with

one night fi ghter crew against

one target. Such close-

controlled interceptions could

easily take fi ve to 10 minutes,

and to achieve four in an hour

in practice would be good

going. But that begs the

questions: are more fi ghters

available and where has the

raid got to?

Our normal control radar was

the wartime AMES Type 7, a

1.5m system providing PPI

displays with a radius of 70

miles. There was no signal

processing — just the raw

returns, both real and phoney.

The aerials, which were

horizontally polarised, were

arranged in bays and stacks

within a mattress-like frame

which rotated about a vertical

axis. As with any such

arrangement (looked at from

the side), signal strength at

different angles of elevation to

the aerial was affected by

refl ections off the ground,

being on a longer path,

tending to either boost or

cancel the direct beam to and

from the target. This resulted in

a series of lobes and gaps in

the coverage, looking like the

petals of a fl ower when

plotted. For the controller,

using the full array, the

variations in signal strength

were still very apparent and

one of our worries was that

information on that gleaned by

Russian aircraft snooping over

the North Sea could be used to

launch raids on downward

paths, following the gaps in our

coverage.

Our other search and control

radar was the AMES Type 14, a

10cm system using a horizontal

trough-shaped refl ector fed

over its full width by a long,

leaky waveguide. In general it

was more accurate than the

Type 7; the gaps were less

apparent and it was less

susceptible to jamming. Most

of the high-level interceptions

were above its fi eld of view but

against low-level raids its

precision and range were very

good. On a subsequent day of

anomalous propagation I

A Meteor F8 being refuelled at RAF

Waterbeach during Exercise ‘Ardent’

as an armed guard looks on. AEROPLANE

22-23_AM_Skywriters_July18_cc C.indd 22 04/06/2018 12:36