JULY 2018 33
gunfire – but enough get through to
destroy one aircraft and damage two
more.
At a crucial time, a squadron of
modern combat aircraft is rendered
combat ineffective.
Everyone knows precisely who
was responsible but actual evidence
is scanty. Recovered UAVs, readily
available commercial models, don’t
carry PLAAF markings and their
operators, quite few in number,
disappeared the moment their little
aircraft were airborne.
Round one goes to the PLA – a
classic case of disruptive technology
where the traditional exercise of air
power was constrained by imaginative
application of a new capability.
This scenario is wholly fictitious
and it might not play out this way at
all. Practically everyone is now aware
of the risk of weaponised unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS) and much
research is being devoted to counter-
UAS technology.
This ranges from basic electronic
counter-measures – most commercial
UAVs operate with common
command protocols on known
frequency bands – through to kinetic
means including net-throwers, guns,
missiles and even hunter-killer UAVs
and trained falcons. Directed energy
weapons defences would appear to
have significant potential.
But the risk of a mass UAV
attack on an air base is real, as wasdemonstrated in January when 13
bomb-carrying drones attacked
two Russian bases in Syria. Ten
headed for Russia’s main Syria base
at Khmeimim in Latakia province.
Another three hit the Russian naval
base at nearby Tartus.
This attack, apparently launched
by anti-Syrian regime rebels caused
no damage or casualties, with all
attackers downed, six by missiles and
seven by electronic counter-measures.
Russian images of one downed
drone show what appears to be a large
fixed-wing model aircraft powered
by a small petrol engine, armed with
small bomblets.
It would appear Russian forces
were ready and well-prepared for such‘But the risk
of a mass
UAV attack on
an air base is
real.’